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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The service sector has increasingly become the cornerstone of most economies in both the 
developed and developing world. The WTO through, inter alia, the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) has attempted to liberalise, promote investment, and break down barriers to 
trade in this sector. The main barrier to trade in services has been the imposition of domestic 
regulations which are aimed at ensuring the affordability, availability, and efficiency of services. 
Such domestic regulations are important for services and the GATS consequently recognises the 
right of countries to regulate in order to achieve these goals. The GATS, however, also seeks to 
discipline such regulations to ensure that they do not hinder trade in services. In doing so, 
questions have been raised about the potential impact that future disciplines on domestic 
regulation might have on the freedom of WTO members to regulate in a way they deem 
appropriate. This study seeks to assess whether the need to regulate services to achieve important 
policy objectives will be affected by provisions of the GATS such as Article VI. In particular, the 
study looks at whether the achievement of important goals such as universal access in the 
telecommunications sector of South Africa will be affected by provisions of the GATS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
___________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The service sector1 has become the primary catalyst for growth in many economies in both 
the developed and developing worlds.2 This can be attributed to the fact that services, though 
important in their own right, also play an important role in the production of most goods.3 In 
addition, the advent and subsequent sophistication of information and communication 
technology (ICT), coupled with the emergence of transnational corporations (TNCs), has not 
only made trade in services easier, but has also increased the demand for cross-border 
provision of such services.4 In 1995 the World Trade Organisation (WTO) established in the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) a set of multilateral rules which were aimed 
at, inter alia, facilitating the liberalisation of services trade, promoting investment, and, 
breaking down national barriers to trade in this area. 
 
Due to the invisible character of services, which have sometimes been defined as ‘anything 
you can buy and sell but cannot drop on your food’,5 the traditional barriers that affect 
                                                   
1  The list of activities that can be considered as services is enormous. A list published by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) includes services that range from medical and dental services, engineering, advertising, 
postal and courier services, hotels and restaurants, to others as far ranging as voice telephone services, sound 
recording, and software implementation (see Annexure A for the full WTO services sectoral classification 
list). In addition (as will be discussed in paragraph 2.3.1.2 below), GATS defines trade in services to include 
four modes of supply, namely: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and 
presence of natural persons.  
2  Karmakar S “Services Trade Liberalisation and Domestic Regulations: The Developing Country 
Conundrum” (2007) 7(1) Global Economy Journal 1. In 2002, it was estimated that ‘the total measurable 
trade in services as defined by the various “modes of supply” subject to multilateral disciplines under the 
World Trade Oganization’s General Agreement on Trade in Services, stood at 2.3 trillion which represented 
7.6 % of the world’s output and close to 1/5 of the total trade in good and services’ (OECD, GATS: The case 
for open service markets, (2002) 3). 
3  WTO “Services Trade” <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm> [accessed on 30 May 
2007]. 
4  Karmakar S “Services Trade Liberalisation and Domestic Regulations: The Developing Country 
Conundrum” (2007) 7(1) Global Economy Journal 1. 
5   Drake W and Nicolaidis K “Ideas Interests and Institutionalization: “Trade in Services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 43. 
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international trade in goods do not have the same impact on services.6 The primary barrier to 
international trade in services is the imposition of numerous domestic regulations. Such 
domestic regulations are particularly important in the services sector because they ensure the 
provision of efficient, effective and competitive services.7 They are also important because 
services, by their nature, can have an effect on the entire economy (for example, financial 
services) or have a direct impact on the well being of a population (for example, health 
services).8 Importantly, where markets have been opened up, domestic regulations are 
important in order to ensure that public policy objectives, such as, accessibility and 
affordability are achieved. This is because most services have a strong public policy 
dimension to them which cannot be ignored. 
 
The importance for individual countries of this right to regulate services is explicitly 
recognised in the Preamble to the GATS which provides that:  
 
‘Members … 
 
Recognizing the right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new 
regulations, on the supply of services within their territories in order to meet 
national policy objectives and, given the asymmetries existing with respect to 
the degree of development of services regulation in different countries, the 
particular need of developing countries to exercise this right; … 
 
Herby agree …’9 
 
Mattoo and Sauvé point out that ‘despite such language and the deference to regulatory 
autonomy and national preferences embedded in it, the interface between domestic regulation 
and trade liberalisation has spawned a lively public policy debate, particularly in developed 
countries’.10 This debate relates to the balance that must be struck between the sovereign right 
of WTO Member countries to continue to regulate in accordance with their national policy 
                                                   
6  Karmakar S “Services Trade Liberalisation and Domestic Regulations: The Developing Country 
Conundrum” (2007) 7(1) Global Economy Journal 3. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Wouters J and Coppens D (2006) “Domestic Regulation Within the Framework of the GATS” Institute of 
International Law Working Paper 93 55. 
9  WTO, General Agreement on Trade in Services, The Legal Texts of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, (2002) 284. 
10  Mattoo, A and Sauvé, P (2003) Domestic Regulation and Services Trade Liberalisation 1. 
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objectives, and the simultaneous need to ensure that this right does not become a barrier to 
market access11 in services.12 
 
Article VI (Domestic Regulation) of the GATS is the relevant provision that attempts to strike 
this delicate balance between the need for domestic regulation and the overarching system of 
international trade law under the auspices of the WTO. It has, however, been noted that Article 
VI, which has a powerful influence on international trade in services, is among one of the 
weakest provisions in the GATS Agreement.13 Mattoo attributes this weakness to the difficulty 
of developing effective multilateral disciplines in this area, without seeming to unduly interfere 
with the national sovereignty of a state and without appearing to limit its ability to regulate 
freely.14 It is important to note in this regard that the term “sovereignty”, as it is used in the 
context of this work, has the meaning attributed to it by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in the Lotus case where the Court stated that ‘the sovereignty of a State is complete in the 
absence of specific legal constraints to the contrary and that one does not presume lightly that 
the sovereignty of a state is restricted’.15  
 
Article VI as it stands is, however, provisional in nature. This is because Article VI:4 tasks the 
Council for Trade in Services (CTS)16 to develop disciplines that will ensure that ‘measures 
relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing 
requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services’.17  
                                                   
11  In the WTO framework market access is a term outlining the government imposed conditions under which a 
product may enter a country under non-discriminatory conditions. Market access in the WTO sense is 
expressed through border measures such as tariffs and non-tariff measures in the case of goods and 
regulations inside the market in the case of services (Goode, W (2003) Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms 
222.)  
12  Karmakar, S “Services Trade Liberalisation and Domestic Regulations: The Developing Country 
Conundrum” (2007) 7(1) Global Economy Journal 3. 
13  Mattoo A “Developing Countries in the New Round of GATS Negotiations: Toward a Pro-Active Role” 
(2000) 23(4) The World Economy 483. 
14  Mattoo A “Developing Countries in the New Round of GATS Negotiations: Toward a Pro-Active Role” 
(2000) 23(4) The World Economy 484. 
15  S.S “Lotus” Judgment 9, 1927, PCIJ Series A, No. 10, P p19.  
16  The Council for Trade in Services is the body administering the GATS. All members of the WTO are 
automatically members of the Council. (Goode, W (2003) Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms 85). 
17  Article VI: 4 states: 
“With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in Services shall, 
through appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines. Such 
disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements are, inter alia: 
(a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the 
ability to supply the service; 
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Consequently, in 1999, the CTS established the Working Party on Domestic Regulation 
(WPDR) with the mandate to develop disciplines appropriate for all service sectors.18 
Discussions on new disciplines have, however, proceeded slowly, which is an indication of the 
delicate and complex nature of the question of domestic regulations.19 
 
In the context of the ongoing Doha Round of trade negotiations,20 paragraph 7 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration21 affirms ‘the right of members under the GATS to regulate, and to 
introduce new regulations on the supply of services’. Furthermore, even though the work of the 
WPDR is formally different from trade liberalisation negotiations mandated by Article XIX22 
of the GATS,23 negotiations in these two areas complement each other and are taking place 
simultaneously.24 WTO members have agreed that one of the central tasks in the ongoing 
negotiations on services is to develop rules that ensure that domestic regulations support the 
opening of markets for services to trade and investment.25  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
(b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; 
(c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the 
supply of the service.” 
18  The Working Party on Domestic Regulations (WPDR) was preceded by Working Party on Professional 
Services (WPPS) which was entrusted with the mandate of GATS Article VI:4 in the field of professional 
services. This working group was successful in developing disciplines governing domestic regulation in the 
accounting sector. These disciplines have become important in the debate regarding the development of 
future disciplines (Majluf, A “Domestic Regulation and the GATS: Challenges for Developing Countries 
<http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2006-02-28/Dom_Reg.pdf> [accessed on 23 May 2007]. 
19  OECD Policy Brief “Open Services Markets matter” <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/0/2443075.pdf> 
[accessed on 31 May 2007]. 
20  ‘Round’ is another term for multilateral trade negotiations and, it refers to efforts aimed at strengthening the 
rules that ensure orderly and fair conduct of international trade, and to reach mutually beneficial agreements 
reducing barriers to world trade. The Doha Round is the unofficial name for the multilateral trade 
negotiations launched at Doha, Qatar, on 14 November 2001. The Doha Round was dubbed the 
‘development round’ because of its agenda, which was to focus on improving the conditions of developing 
countries. During the writing of this work, negotiations on this Round seem to have collapsed, and the 
implications for domestic regulation and the services sector as a whole will be considered in chapter 5 
below.  (Goode, W (2003) Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms 238.) 
21 The Doha Ministerial Declaration was adopted on 14 November 2001 - accessible at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. 
22  Article XIX mandates Members to enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five 
years from the date of entry into force of the GATS (the GATS entered into force in 1995). Such 
negotiations are to be aimed at achieving progressively higher levels of liberalisation.  
23  Wouters J and Coppens D (2006) “Domestic Regulation within the framework of the GATS” Institute of 
International Law Working Paper 93 18. 
24  Karmakar S “Services Trade Liberalisation and Domestic Regulations: The Developing Country 
Conundrum” (2007) 7(1) Global Economy Journal 7. 
25  Mattoo, A and Sauvé, P (2003) Domestic Regulation and Services Trade Liberalisation 1. 
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1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
Ensuring that services, especially public services26 meet the needs and expectations of people, 
especially the poor and marginalised, depends on governments actively setting rules, policies, 
and procedures for these services.27 Similarly, meeting international development targets such 
as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)28 requires that governments’ promulgate 
proper regulations for such services, and, it goes without saying, adequately implements them. 
For example, Target 8F of Goal 8 of the MDGs calls on governments, ‘in cooperation with 
the private sector, to make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information 
and communication’, a goal which can only be achieved through proper policy formulation.29 
Furthermore, the constitutions of some states recognise socio-economic rights as enforceable 
rights and states therefore have a duty to regulate to ensure the fulfilment of these rights. For 
example, section 27 of the South African Constitution,30 which is the supreme law of the 
country, guarantees everyone the right to health and obliges the state to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures to ensure the progressive realisation of these rights.31 States 
therefore have specific policy objectives as well as obligations imposed on them by law when 
regulating services which they seek to achieve through ‘legislative, administrative, budgetary, 
judicial and other measures’.32 This need to regulate to achieve specific policy objectives has 
been referred to above and is explicitly acknowledged by the GATS through, inter alia, its 
Preamble. 
 
The GATS, however, also recognises the desire to establish principles and rules for trade in 
services with a view to their expansion and progressive liberalisation.33 In this regard it is 
                                                   
26  The question of whether public services are covered by the GATS will be considered below. This questions 
will be considered largely based on the views of authors who have published extensively on the GATS as 
the WTO dispute settlement bodies have not yet conclusively decided on whether the GATS covers public 
services. 
27  Mashayekhi, Julsaint and Tuerk (2006) “International Trade in Health Services and the GATS: Current 
issues and debates” 19. 
28  The MDGs are a set of goals agreed upon by all of the world’s countries. They range from halving extreme 
poverty and halting the spread of HIV/AIDS to providing universal primary education by the year 2015. 
29  United Nations, MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development, 
<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml> [accessed on 18 October 2008]. 
30  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
31  Own emphasis 
32  United Nations Economic and Social Council (2002) “Liberalisation of trade in services and human rights: 
Report of the High Commissioner” (2002) 10. 
33  Para 2 of the Preamble to the GATS provides in this regard that: 
“Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in 
services with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency 
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important to clarify the point that the goal of the GATS is the progressive liberalisation of 
trade in services, and its essential concern is certainly not the deregulation of the service 
sector. These two terms are sometimes used interchangeably which, as Mattoo and Sauvé 
point out, is incorrect, because service liberalisation often requires regulation and re-
regulation.34 When considering the effect of the GATS on national sovereignty, the main 
concern of this work, therefore, is not the loss of the ability to regulate per se, but the possible 
inability of a country to regulate in a manner that it deems appropriate.35  
 
The need to balance the right to regulate in order to achieve public policy objectives, on the 
one hand, with those of economic efficiency and international competitiveness, on the other, 
raises a dilemma, particularly for developing countries.36 One of the concerns raised in this 
regard includes the possible creation of a “necessity test” which would require Members to 
ensure that their regulations are not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of 
services or to achieve a particular objective.37 It has been noted that such a test would be 
problematic for many countries.38 This is so because, for example, developing countries need 
to be able to determine where to invest their resources, and the less restrictive trade option can 
sometimes result in greater cost, and might also not be the best way of achieving desired 
social goals and objectives.39  
 
This study seeks to investigate whether in public services, and in particular, in the 
telecommunications (telecoms) sector of South Africa, the GATS could restrict national 
sovereignty in pursuing public policy objectives through licenses issued to telecoms 
operators. Put differently, in the context of the ongoing work to develop new disciplines 
regarding domestic regulation, how can a balance be struck between ensuring that domestic 
                                                                                                                                                               
and progressive liberalisation and as a means of promoting the economic growth of all 
trading partners and the development of developing countries.” 
34  Mattoo A and Sauvé P (2003) Domestic Regulation and Services Trade Liberalisation 1. 
35  Mattoo A and Sauvé P (2003) Domestic Regulation and Services Trade Liberalisation 2. 
36  Mashayekhi, Julsaint and Tuerk (2006) ‘International Trade in Health Services and the GATS: Current 
issues and debates’ 19. 
37  Mashayekhi, Julsaint and Tuerk (2006) ‘International Trade in Health Services and the GATS: Current 
issues and debates’ 55. Necessity tests typically require that covered measures which restrict trade do no go 
beyond what is “necessary” to achieve the Member’s policy objectives. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Ibid. Another cause for concern may lie in the fact that the necessity test has been raised by Members either 
as a justification or as a defence in numerous cases, and in every case except one, (European Communities – 
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos- Containing Products, Appellant Body Report, Wt/DS/135/AB/R) 
the defence had been rejected. For a further discussion on this issue see paragraph 3.4.1 below.  
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regulations do not hinder international trade, and ensuring that the need to regulate important 
public services is not limited? 
 
1.3 Key definitions 
 
In order to adequately investigate this delicate balancing act, two key concepts that are central 
to the entire study must be defined. These concepts are ‘public services’ and ‘domestic 
regulation’. 
 
1.3.1  What are ‘public services’? 
 
‘Public services’ are often defined by citing examples of services that would be considered as 
such. For example, they can be defined by naming examples, such as, education, law 
enforcement, or health. It is, however, important to note that what constitutes public services 
differs in different contexts. What are considered as public services might differ from country 
to country or even among different members of a particular community.40 This is partly due to 
the fact that what constitutes public services depends on factors, such as, social norms, 
concepts of the role of the state, the nature of a particular market, or the amount of resources 
available to government.41 Accordingly, a precise definition of ‘public services’ is difficult. 
This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that public services can also be defined by 
looking at what is being supplied, to whom it is being supplied, or who is supplying the 
services.42 
 
Several attempts have, however, been made at defining “public services.” Krajewski defines 
public services as a ‘special subset of services provided by or under the control of a public 
authority, because these services are considered special compared to other services’.43 Cassim 
and Steuart observe that a common conception of a public service is one that is supplied by 
                                                   
40  Cassim and Steuart “Public Services and the GATS” 
<http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/services/products/Cassim_Steuart_part3.pdf> [accessed on 11 June 2007]. For 
example, Europe has a strong tradition of public health systems whereas in the United States, health care is 
predominantly provided by the private sector (Krajewski, M ‘Public Services and the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) 2001Center for International Environmental Law Research Paper 4). 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Krajewski M “Public Services and Trade Liberalisation: Mapping the legal framework” (2003) 6(2) Journal 
of International Economics 343. 
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any level of governmental agency, or public enterprise.44 Grout and Stevens define these 
services as ‘services provided for large numbers of citizens, in which there is a potential 
significant market failure justifying government involvement whether in production, finance 
or regulation’.45  
 
Importantly, and as is evident from the definition preferred by Grout and Stevens, public 
services do not necessarily need to be provided by the public sector. For the purposes of this 
work, the definition preferred is a synthesis of the above definitions. In other words, in this 
work, ‘public services’ can be defined as a special subset of services which are provided for 
large numbers of people, and which, because of their nature, justify government involvement, 
whether in production, finance, or regulation. 
 
As noted above, this study examines the telecoms sector as a case study of an area where the 
tension between trade liberalisation and domestic regulation might be visible. One of the key 
questions that arises in this regard is whether telecom services can be considered public 
services and whether the public policy element discussed above attaches to these services. 
Answering this question had until recently been fairly easy. Telecom services in most 
countries were provided by state owned operators and administered and regulated through 
various government departments.46 This has however changed in the last few years with the 
privatisation of many state owned telecoms operators which has made their status as public 
services more uncertain.47  
 
This notwithstanding, governments in most countries continue to see telecoms as an essential 
service and continue to ‘ensure that these services are supplied in a manner consistent with 
national perceptions of public interest’.48 This can be attributed, inter alia, to the potentially 
important role that telecoms can play in the development of any country. A United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) secretariat document on universal access 
to essential services noted in relation to telecoms that, their ‘essential nature stems from their 
                                                   
44  Cassim and Steuart “Public Services and the GATS” 
<http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/services/products/Cassim_Steuart_Part3.pdf> [accessed on 11 June 2007]. 
45  Grout and Stevens “Financing and Managing Public Services: An Assessment” < 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/workingpapers/wp76.pdf> [accessed on 11 June 2007]. 
46  Melody, H (1997) Telecom Reform: Principles, Policies, and Regulatory Practices, 1. 
47  Intven H and Tetrault M (eds) (2001)Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, 1-1. 
48  Ibid. 
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importance for economic growth’ and from the wider benefits associated with ICT, such as, 
the ability to facilitate citizen participation and promote national cohesion by reducing 
disparities in urban and rural areas.49 The report further notes that there is a growing trend in 
many countries to consider access to ICT as a basic right of all citizens.50 Countries therefore 
regulate this sector to ensure that among other things these services are affordable and 
accessible to all citizens. In addition, many countries, particularly in the developing world, are 
just embarking on the liberalisation process, and therefore, truly open markets in this sector 
are yet to be realised.51 For these reasons, even though telecoms are increasingly not strictly 
classified as public services, they retain characteristics of such services which often warrants 
close government regulation especially for social objectives, such as, access and affordability. 
Such regulation can potentially be limited by WTO law in general, and, Article VI of the 
GATS in particular. It is because of this public interest element as well as the central role that 
telecommunications plays in the socio-economic development of all countries that it is 
considered in this discussion on the potential effect of the GATS on public services.52  
 
1.3.2 What is ‘domestic regulation’? 
 
Even though the GATS specifically utilises the term ‘domestic regulation’ in Article VI, no 
definition of what this concept entails is provided. A precise definition of the word 
‘regulation’ is also difficult to come by because a wide variety of meanings of this word exist. 
It can have a distinct political, legal or economic meaning.53 On a basic level, an Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Report on Regulatory Reform states 
that, among OECD countries, the term ‘regulation’ is used to refer to a diverse set of 
instruments by which governments set requirements for enterprises and citizens.54 The Report 
places regulation into three categories, namely, economic regulation which is aimed at 
intervening directly in market decisions, such as, pricing; social regulation which is aimed at 
                                                   
49  UNCTAD Secretariat, Universal Access to Services, (2006) TD/B/COM.1/EM.30/2, para 12. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Keck A and Djiofack-Zebaze C, ‘Telecommunications services in Africa: The impact of multilateral 
commitments and unilateral reform on sector performance and economic growth’, (2006) WTO Staff 
Working Paper ERSD-2006-10 7. 
52  It is also worth noting that the working definition of ‘public services’ selected for this study envisions 
services that are provide for a large number of people and which because of their nature, warrant 
government regulation. Telecoms would undoubtedly be covered by such a definition.  
53  Krajewski M, (2003) National Regulation and Trade Liberalisation in Services: The Legal impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy 1. 
54  OECD, “The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform 
Synthesis”<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/25/2391768.pdf> [accessed on July 26, 2007]. 
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protecting public interests, such as, health and the environment; and administrative regulation 
through which governments intervene in individual decisions.55  
 
Karmakar suggests that, in its widest sense, “regulation” can be used to refer to ‘all 
mechanisms of social control including those that are not necessarily related to state activity’, 
whereas in its narrowest sense it refers to a ‘specific form of governance through targeted 
authoritative rules that are often accompanied by some regulatory body to monitor and 
enforce compliance’.56 This commentator suggests, with some merit, that, in the absence of a 
formal definition of “domestic regulation” in GATS, the concept of domestic regulation 
would seem closest to the narrow definition. 
 
Krajewski, on the other hand, supports a definition of “regulation” which views regulation as 
a ‘process or activity in which government requires or proscribes certain activities or behavior 
on the part of individuals and institutions, mostly private, but sometimes public’.57 Krajewski 
favours this approach because he considers it broad enough to encompass the concept of 
regulation in most countries. The learned author argues convincingly that “regulation” in its 
broadest sense should be understood as the use of governmental policies and measures in 
order to influence, control and guide economic or other private activities.58  
 
On a practical level Article VI of the GATS, which lists qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements as measures against which the 
new disciplines on domestic regulation are to be tested, might serve as an example of what the 
Agreement contemplates as domestic regulation.   
 
1.4 Aims of the thesis 
 
The aim of this work is to analyse the current provisions on domestic regulation contained in 
the GATS, as well as to examine the negotiations on future disciplines currently being worked 
on by WTO members. In particular it aims to see what impact these rules will have on the 
                                                   
55  Ibid. 
56  Karmakar S “Services Trade Liberalisation and Domestic Regulations: The Developing Country 
Conundrum” (2007) 7(1) Global Economy Journal 6. 
57  Krajewski M (2003) National Regulation and Trade Liberalisation in Services: The Legal impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy 4. 
58  Ibid. 
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licensing of telecoms services. In addition the study seeks to investigate whether, on a proper 
analysis and understanding of the legal texts on domestic regulation, the claims made by some 
civil society organisations and NGOs are valid.59  
 
1.5 Methodology 
 
The research methods used for this study are largely library based. In other words, books, 
journal articles, WTO agreements, and case law on the subject provide the major part of the 
information used. Electronic sources accessed on the internet are also an important source of 
information because of the novelty of the services trade, and because up to date material on 
the ongoing negotiations on domestic regulation is often available there first.  
 
1.6 Defined scope of the thesis 
 
Even though domestic regulation has an important impact across all service sectors, this work 
concentrates on the telecoms sector. This is because of the importance of this sector in the 
economies of all countries, and in particular, because of the potentially significant role 
telecommunications can play in the development objectives of many countries. The study also 
limits itself to a discussion of domestic regulation in the context of the GATS. In assessing 
the potential impact of future disciplines on domestic regulation, the study focuses mainly on 
the position of Developing and Least Developing Countries (LDCs).60 Furthermore, even 
though it might sometimes be necessary to consider certain economic arguments and reasons 
related to this work, the study will focus primarily on an analysis of the legal texts and 
arguments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
59  Many NGOs and civil society organisations have heavily criticised the GATS, arguing that it has the 
potential to severely affect the delivery of essential services to the poor and vulnerable.  
60  A country is declared a LDC by the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council based on criteria that 
include, among other things, per capita GNP, life expectancy, adult literacy, and the combined primary and 
secondary education enrolment ratio. The list of currently includes countries, such as, Angola, Benin, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Haiti, Kiribati, Mali, Nepal, Samoa, Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, Rwanda, Uganda, 
Yemen and Zambia just to name a few (Goode, W (2003) Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms 212).  
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1.7 Overview of the chapters 
 
This study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the history and general framework of 
the GATS, as well as analyses the important issue of its scope. This discussion serves as a 
lens through which the remainder of the study is observed. Chapter 3 comprehensively 
examines the issues surrounding Article VI (Domestic Regulation) of the GATS. The chapter 
will also look at possible lessons regarding domestic regulation that can be drawn from other 
WTO agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS). In addition the 
section will look at the relationship between domestic regulation, market access and national 
treatment. Chapter 4 looks at the potential implications for the telecoms sector of future WTO 
rules on domestic regulation. Chapter 5 contains a summary of the conclusions drawn from 
the whole study and, importantly, contains recommendations for Members, especially 
developing countries, which are currently engaged in negotiations on future disciplines on 
domestic regulation. 
 
1.8  Conclusion 
  
The growing importance of the services trade is abundantly clear both in economic data and 
in the increasing focus being placed on this sector by many countries. As has been explained 
above, services by their nature require regulation by governments. In the context of the 
multilateral rules of the world trading system this need to regulate services can create a 
potential dilemma especially where public services are concerned. The next chapter discusses 
the evolution of the services trade, as well as the general structure of the GATS. In the 
discussion on the general structure of the GATS the important question of the scope of the 
Agreement will also be addressed. This question is important in understanding whether public 
services, which are the primary focus of this study, are covered by the provisions of the 
GATS. 
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_______________________________________________________ 
 
 CHAPTER 2  
HISTORY AND GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE GATS 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2.1  History of the trade in services 
 
For hundreds of years services moved across borders but it was not until the 1970s that they 
began to be thought of as having the characteristic of being trade.61 There are various reasons 
which account for this belief. They include first, the view that services were generally not 
seen as being important in their own right. In other words, in terms of this view, services such 
as those provided by accountants, consultants, and advertisers, were seen as dependent on 
goods in that, without the production of goods, there would be little demand for these 
services.62 In addition, compared to physical objects, services were seen as insignificant 
because of their ‘invisibility and temporary existence’.63 
 
Drake and Nicolaidis64 highlight three distinct stages in the development of the services trade 
which led to their status as trade commodities which they now occupy on the international 
trade law agenda.   
 
2.1.1  First stage 
 
The first stage started in the 1970’s when the topic of trade in services begun being mentioned 
as fit for inclusion on the trade negotiating agenda.65 During this stage, a group of experts met 
under the auspices of the OECD66 to consider the long-term outlook for trade in light of the 
multilateral round of trade negotiations which was scheduled to take place at the beginning of 
                                                   
61  Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 41.  
62  Ibid. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 37. 
65  OECD, GATS: The case for open service markets, (2002) 17. 
66  The OECD is an organisation made up of members who share a commitment to democratic government and 
the market economy. Its work covers economic and social issues, trade, education, development, and 
science innovation. Its members include Australia, Canada, Franca, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. (www.oecd.org). 
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1973.67 A Report resulting from the work of this group coined for the first time the phrase 
“trade in services”. In addition, the report also made several important observations about the 
services trade. For example, it noted that: 
 
‘The Group has not made a detailed examination of questions concerning 
international trade in services. It considers however that, from the point of 
view of international economic relations, this sector poses problems similar 
in nature to those met with in merchandise trade. Given that services are a 
sector which seem likely to expand rapidly in countries’ economies, the main 
need is to avoid any tendencies to protectionism and to aim at achieving a 
more thorough liberalisation’.68 
 
Drake and Nicolaidis note that these views, which suggested that transactions in services could 
be considered trade and that principles for trade in goods could be applied, constituted a huge 
conceptual leap because, up to that time, services had never been viewed in this way by any of 
the institutions that oversaw them.69 
 
During this first stage the United States had also begun making strong diplomatic efforts to 
convince other countries to prepare for multilateral negotiations on trade in services.70 The 
United States’ interest lay in the fact that it had some of the world’s largest services firms but 
barriers to other countries’ markets had made competitive entry for them more difficult in the 
services sector.71 The efforts of the United States centered around two related objectives, 
namely, achieving the liberalisation of national impediments to traded services, and devising 
new multilateral rules to govern international transactions in services.72  
                                                   
67  Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interest,s and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 45. The next multilateral round of negotiations was called 
the Tokyo Round. This was the seventh round of the GATT multilateral trade negotiations and it took place 
between 1973 and 1979 (Goode, W (2003) Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms 343. 
68  OECD Report by the High Level Group on Trade and Related Problems (Paris: OECD, 1973) quoted in 
Drake and Nicolaidis (1992) 45. 
69  Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 45. 
70  Malmgren B.H.  “Negotiating International Rules for Trade in Services,” (1985) 8 World Economy 11. 
71  Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 46. 
72  Malmgren B.H. (1985) “Negotiating International Rules for Trade in Services,” (1985) 8 World Economy 
11. 
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Furthermore, during this period the development of services was further influenced by the 
emergence of the ability to transmit information across borders through telecommunications.73 
This was significant because it highlighted new ways in which services could be moved, which 
had previously not been thought of. Drake and Nicolaidis explain the significance of this 
discovery when they say: 
 
‘When analysts first thought of services flows as trade, they visualized 
movements of individuals or organisations that brought sellers and buyers 
into physical and temporal proximity. But now it appeared that there was 
another major means of supply: ‘electronic highways’ allowing sellers and 
buyers to remain apart while exchanging information-based services … In 
short, advanced computer networks collapsed space and time’.74 
 
Despite these developments most countries, the United States being the exception, were not yet 
convinced by the new thinking on the trade character of services.75 One of the reasons for this 
was that there were still several issues relating to trade in goods that remained outstanding 
from the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations and other countries saw the introduction of 
services as a distraction from some of the issues that were not complete.76  Particularly 
opposed to this view were LDCs. They were opposed to the idea because they assumed that 
their services industries would not be competitive globally, and they viewed the US as 
interested only in services liberalisation because their large TNCs would benefit from the 
LCD’s markets.77 Developing countries also feared the possibility of more industrialised 
countries taking over sensitive services sectors such as finance or telecommunications.78 
 
2.1.2  Second stage 
 
The second stage in the development of services trade took place between 1982 and 1986. 
During this period GATT members began to assess what an agreement on the liberalisation of 
                                                   
73  Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 47. 
74  Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 48. 
75  OECD, GATS: The case for open service markets, (2002) 19. 
76  Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 51. 
77  Malmgren B.H. (1985) “Negotiating International Rules for Trade in Services,” (1985) 8 World Economy 
12. 
78  OECD, GATS: The case for open service markets, (2002) 19. 
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services would mean for their national policies.79 Among the issues they looked at were, for 
example: (i) what changes would be required if regulations were looked at as non-tariff barriers 
to trade (NTBs); (ii) the effect the free movement of professionals would have on quality and 
safety objectives; and (iii) whether monetary stability would be affected by the free provision 
of financial services.80   
 
This period was also significant because some consensus began to emerge regarding the 
productiveness, measurability, divisibility and mobility of services.81 This was significant 
because this consensus, which attributed trade-like properties to services, meant that rather 
than coming up with entirely new rules to govern trade in services, general trade rules such as 
the unconditional most favored nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT) rules could be used 
as a starting point to assess issues related to trade in services.82 There was, however, also 
recognition that, because services by their nature were different from goods, the traditional 
rules that had been applied to trade in goods could not be transposed to services.83 
 
This, therefore, led to the realisation that even though the GATT organisation was the 
appropriate venue for negotiations, the GATT rules did not suffice, and that what was required 
was a separate treaty.84 Toward the end of 1985, the GATT contracting parties established a 
committee to lay the groundwork for a new round of negotiations. One of the big questions at 
the time of the formation of the group was whether services would be included as one of the 
issues.  
 
                                                   
79  Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations) 54. 
80  Ibid. 
81  OECD, GATS: The case for open service markets, (2002) 17-18. 
82  Ibid. The MFN rule requires that a country gives each of the trading partners with which it has concluded 
relevant agreements the best treatment it gives to any of them in a given product. The fundamental point of 
MFN is therefore equality of treatment of other countries. National treatment, on the other hand, requires 
that a country give others the same treatment as it gives its own nationals (Goode, W (2003) Dictionary of 
Trade Policy Terms 242).  
83   Some of the differences inherent to services that meant that not all goods trade rules could be applied to 
services include: (1) not all services transactions appeared to fit under the definition of trade, as products 
produced entirely in one country and purchased in another; (2) unlike the case with goods, tariffs were not 
the relevant impediments to trade, and a distinction therefore needed to be made between illegitimate NTBs 
and legitimate regulations. (3) There were some concerns regarding the extension of the MFN principle to 
services, such as, telecommunications and air transport (Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and 
institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay Round” (1992) 37 International Organisations 63-
3). 
84  Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 63. 
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2.1.3  Third stage 
 
In September of 1986, members gathered in Uruguay where they reached unanimous 
agreement on a ministerial declaration launching the Uruguay Round.85 This signified the third 
important stage in the development of the services. For services trade, this was significant 
because, the declaration provided that the first part of the round would cover trade in goods 
while the second would address trade in services.86 The outcome of these negotiations was the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which provided for a set of binding rules and 
disciplines to promote orderly and transparent trade and investment liberalisation in services.87 
The content, scope, and strength of the provisions of this agreement are considered in the 
following sections.  
 
2.2 General framework of the GATS 
  
Since its coming into effect GATS has often been surrounded by a lot of debate and 
controversy especially with regards to its possible negative effects on public services. Various 
authors have, however, noted that these debates are often conducted without a proper 
understanding of the Agreement itself.88 The purpose of the following sections is to provide an 
overview of the general framework of the GATS which is important for a proper analysis of 
the issues surrounding public services and domestic regulation. 
 
2.3  Scope and definition of the GATS 
 
The starting point in considering the GATS as an agreement is the scope of the Agreement. In 
other words, it is important to first understand specifically which aspects of services trade are 
covered by the Agreement. A consideration of the scope of the GATS is particularly 
                                                   
85   Drake, W and Nicolaidis, K “Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay 
Round” (1992) 46(1) International Organisations 68. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Chanda R “Social Services and the GATS: Key Issues and Concerns” (2003) 13(12) World Development 
1997. 
88  For example, the WTO published a document entitled GATS – Fact and Fiction in which it sought to correct 
statements made about the GATS in various publications which it considered to be misleading and to be 
based on an incorrect understanding of the GATS. (accessible at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsfacts1004_e.pdf). Similarly, authors, such as, Chanda have 
noted that ‘the debate on GATS lacks a proper analysis that is based on the various features of the 
agreement.’ (Chanda R “Social Services and the GATS: Key Issues and Concerns” (2003) 13(12) World 
Development 1998). 
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significant because any potential impact which the Agreement might have on public services 
depends fundamentally on its breadth and scope. The scope of the GATS can be examined in 
three different ways, namely, by looking at: (i) its regulatory scope; (ii) its institutional scope; 
and (iii) its sectoral scope.89 The regulatory and institutional scopes of the GATS are 
determined by Articles I:(1)(2) and 3(a) respectively whereas the sectoral scope is determined 
by Article I:(3)(b)(c).90 
 
2.3.1  The regulatory and institutional scopes of the GATS 
 
Article I(1) provides that the Agreement shall apply to ‘measures by Members affecting trade 
in services’. The importance of this Article in determining the scope of the GATS was 
highlighted by the Appellate Body in Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry (“Canada – Autos”) where it was stated that a threshold question for a panel in any 
case involving claims under the GATS is whether the measure being considered falls within 
the scope of the GATS by examining whether it is a measure “affecting trade in services” 
within the meaning of Article I of the GATS.91  
 
The wording of this article on its own is, however, insufficient to provide a clear picture of 
what exactly the regulatory and institutional scopes of the GATS entail. It is, therefore, 
important to examine the following key components of Article I:(1), ‘measures by Members’ 
and ‘trade in services’.92  
 
2.3.1.1 ‘Measures by Members’ 
  
The first part of Article I:(1) that must be looked at is the phrase “measures by Members.” An 
understanding of what exactly this phrase entails is not difficult because the Agreement, in 
Articles I:3(a) and XXVIII provides a precise definition of its meaning. Article XXVII, 
specifically defines the word “measures” to mean ‘any measure by a member, whether in the 
                                                   
89  Krajewski M “Public Services and Trade Liberalisation: Mapping the legal framework” (2003) 6(2) Journal 
of International Economic Law 347. 
90  Ibid. 
91  Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS142/AB/R para 152. Even though 
this quote refers specifically to Article I, it is equally applicable to Article I:3(a) because the latter provides 
a definition of the word “measure” which is central to an understanding of Article I. 
92  UNCTAD “Dispute settlement: GATS” <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add31_en.pdf> 
[accessed on 17 April 2007]. 
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form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form’. 
Examples of the above would include: national legislation of members, municipal by-laws, 
rules adopted by professional bodies regarding professional qualifications and licensing, 
which can all potentially be covered by the GATS.93 This Article, therefore, provides a 
picture of the regulations that the GATS can potentially influence. 
 
Article I (3)(a), on the other, hand provides that:  
   
‘For the purposes of this Agreement: 
   (a)  “measures by members” means measures taken by: 
(i) central, regional or local governments and authorities; and 
(ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by 
central, regional or local governments or authorities’. 
 
This Article, on the other hand, contains the scope that the GATS has in respect of actions 
taken by various institutions in a country. Read together, the Articles highlighted above set 
out both the regulatory and institutional scopes of the GATS. 
 
2.3.1.2 ‘Trade in services’: Modes of supply 
 
The second important component of Article I:(1) which requires definition is the phrase 
“trade in services”. An understanding of this phrase is important to know the breadth of 
activities which are considered as trade in services and which, as a result, are covered by the 
Agreement.   
 
The definition of this phrase, which is set out in Article I:(2), is four pronged, depending on 
the territorial presence of the supplier and the consumer at the time of the transaction.94 
Accordingly, the Article provides that “trade in services” is defined as the supply of a service: 
 
"(a) from the territory of one member into the territory of any other member. 
(b) in the territory of one member to the service consumer of any other member. 
                                                   
93  Ibid. 
94 WTO “GATS training module: Definition of Services trade and modes of supply 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/c1s3p1_e.htm> [accessed on 16 April 2007]. 
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(c) by a services supplier of one member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other 
member. 
(d) by a services supplier of one member, through presence of natural persons of a member in the 
territory of any other member’. 
 
The above descriptions of trade in services are commonly referred to in WTO terminology as 
“modes of supply”.95 In other words, the descriptions mentioned in (a) – (d) above would be 
referred to as modes 1 – 4 respectively. Mode 1 is also commonly referred to as ‘cross border 
supply,’ mode 2 as ‘consumption abroad’, mode 3 as ‘commercial presence’, and mode 4 as 
‘presence of natural persons’.96  
 
The combined effect of the above definitions is that the GATS applies to a wide range of 
government regulatory actions as well as to all spheres of government and NGOs to whom 
power has been delegated by any of these spheres. In other words, they set out the types of 
regulations and government institutions that fall within the scope of the GATS.  
 
2.3.2 The sectoral scope of the GATS 
 
The sectoral scope of the GATS, which sets out the particular services covered by the 
Agreement, completes the picture of the GATS’ scope. Article I:(3)(b)(c) which governs the 
sectoral scope states that: 
 ‘For the purpose of this Agreement … 
 
(b) “services” includes any service in any sector except services supplied in 
the exercise of governmental authority; 
(c) “a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority” means any 
service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in 
competition with one or more service suppliers’. (own emphasis) 
 
                                                   
95  WTO “Understanding the WTO: GATS explained 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf>[accessed on 17 April 2007]. 
96  The following are practical examples of the four modes of supply: 
Mode 1: Services provided through telecommunication, such as, consulting, telemedicine and distance 
training. 
Mode 2: Includes hotel or restaurant services for non-residents, training programs for foreign students and 
health services provided to non-residents.  
 Mode 3: Local offices of multinational services firms and offices for infrastructure projects. 
 4: Includes independent services suppliers moving temporarily to another country to provide services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
In terms of this provision the crucial determinant for the non-applicability or exclusion of the 
GATS from a particular service sector is whether such a service is “supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority”. Put differently, if a service is supplied97 “in the exercise of 
governmental authority”, then such a service is excluded from the scope of the GATS.  
 
Services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority are, in turn, defined by Article 
I:(3)(c) as services supplied ‘neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one or 
more supplier’. The link between these provisions and the scope of the GATS lies in the fact 
that, if a broad definition of “commercial basis” and “in competition” is adopted, then the 
notion of governmental authority is narrow, and almost all services would be covered by the 
GATS.98 Conversely, if a narrow interpretation of “commercial basis” and “in competition” is 
adopted, the scope of governmental authority is larger, and less services fall under the 
GATS.99 A clear and coherent understanding of this provision is, therefore, necessary to 
determine if, in particular, public services are covered by the GATS. 
 
Despite the importance of the meaning of these terms to the scope of the GATS, there remains 
great uncertainty about their meaning. Neither the Agreement itself nor any of the WTO’s 
dispute settlement bodies has provided any guidance as to the meaning of these provisions. To 
complicate matters further, the WTO Secretariat seems to have put forward contrasting views 
on the exact meaning of these phrases.  
 
For example, in a background paper100 published on health and social services, the WTO 
Secretariat observed that even though it was possible for institutional arrangements governing 
the provision of health, medical and social services to vary from complete government 
ownership, on the one extreme, to full private participation, on the other, the norm in most 
                                                   
97  Article XXVIII (b) defines “supply a services" as including the production, distribution, marketing, sale, and 
delivery of a service. 
98  Krajewski, M ‘Public Services and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 2001Center for 
International Environmental Law Research Paper 6. 
99  Ibid. 
100  Background papers on various services, including health and social service, were written as part of the 
information exchange program conducted by the CTS.  Their purpose was to give an overview of recent 
economic and regulatory developments, including commitments under the GATS, in the medical, health and 
social services sectors.   
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countries was usually for government and private entities to provide these services side by 
side.101  
 
Where there is this co-existence of public and private providers, the Secretariat acknowledged 
that this had the potential to raise questions about the competitive relationship between the 
two providers, and as a result, about the applicability of Article I:3.102 In other words, such a 
situation posed the specific question whether, given this co-existence, a conclusion could be 
drawn that the services being provided by government and private entities were being 
provided in competition with one another.103 In the background paper the Secretariat 
answered this question by noting that, in such a situation, it would seem unrealistic to argue 
that no competitive relationship existed between the two groups of suppliers.104 This 
conclusion would mean that, by virtue of article I:3(c), such services would be removed from 
services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority and the GATS would, therefore, 
be applicable. 
 
In a different paper, entitled Market Access: Unfinished Business Post-Uruguay Round 
Inventory and Issues,105 the Secretariat reached what seems to be a conclusion contradictory 
to the above mentioned position. In this document, it is noted: 
 
‘It is perfectly possible for governmental services to co-exist in the same 
jurisdiction with private services. In the health and education sectors this is 
so common as to be virtually the norm …. It seems clear that the existence of 
private health services, for example, in parallel with public services could not 
be held to invalidate the status of the latter as ‘governmental services’: this 
would void the exclusion of governmental services of most of its 
significance’. 
 
This view is again reinforced by a former director of the Trade in Services Division of the 
WTO Secretariat, David Hartridge, when he noted that: 
                                                   
101  WTO Secretariat “Health and Social Services, Background Note by the Secretariat” 
<http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_viewerwindow.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/S/C/W
50.DOC> [accessed on 18 June 2007]. 
102  Ibid para 38. 
103  Ibid. 
104  Ibid para 39 
105  WTO Secretariat Market Access: Unfinished Business Post-Uruguay Round Inventory and Issues 
<http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/special_study_6_e.pdf> [accessed on 18 June 2007]. 
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‘We … have to be clear that public sector services, in health and education 
for example, can and almost invariably do coexist in the same jurisdiction 
with private suppliers without being in competition with them and therefore 
without losing the status of governmental services. Police services don't 
‘compete’ with the private security firms working alongside them. I doubt if 
there is a single WTO Member where public and private services do not 
coexist in this way, and where the public sector would not be seen as 
governmental services excluded from GATS coverage’.106  
 
Given this ambiguity and the lack of WTO jurisprudence on the sectoral scope of the GATS, 
various authors have sought to decipher the meaning of Article I:3 by using the generally 
accepted rules of treaty interpretation encapsulated in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.107  
 
In terms of Article 31:1 of the Vienna Convention the most important rule in treaty 
interpretation is that a ‘treaty should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its 
objective and purpose’. Article 31:2 provides that the context includes, in addition to the text, 
the treaty’s preamble and annexes. Article 32, on the other hand, provides that supplementary 
means of interpretation, such as, the preparatory texts of the treaty, can be used to confirm 
what is deciphered by means of Article 31, or where Article 31 does not provide a satisfactory 
conclusion. 
 
2.3.2.1 ‘Commercial basis’ 
 
When considering the meaning of the words ‘commercial basis’ it is important to remember 
that the GATS Article 1(3)(c) states that ‘a services supplied in the exercise of governmental 
authority means any service supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with 
                                                   
106  WTO News “WTO Secretariat hits false attacks against GATS: Speech by David Hartridge, Director of 
Trade in Services Division, WTO Secretariat” 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/gats2000neg_hartridge_e.htm> [accessed on 19 June 
2007}. 
107  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.1155, 331. It is widely 
accepted that that these rules represent customary international law and can, therefore, be used for the 
interpretation of any treaty. These rules have been applied by WTO dispute settlement bodies in various 
cases. 
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one or more service suppliers’.108 The GATS defines the term “supply of service” as including 
the production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery of a service.109 This is significant 
because it means that the nature or identity of the services supplier is not relevant per se.110 In 
other words, what must be considered is not whether government is behind, for example, the 
supply of health or education services, but rather, whether the means of supplying such 
services is commercial or not.  
 
In relation to the meaning of ‘commercial basis’, Krajewski begins by looking at the text of 
Article I:3(c) and, in accordance with article 31 of the Vienna Convention, attributing to the 
word ‘commercial’ its ordinary meaning. Based on a dictionary reading, he concludes that the 
ordinary dictionary definition of the word ‘commercial’ can have two possible meanings. First, 
‘commercial’ can be understood as referring to an act of buying and selling or the exchanging 
of goods without the expectation of making profit.111  The key feature of this definition is that 
profit is not a key characteristic of the word. Krajewski notes that, in terms of this definition, 
the supply of water at a very low, subsidised rates could, for example, be considered as an act 
of buying and selling, and only services provided for free would be excluded from the sectoral 
scope of the GATS.112 A second possible definition of ‘commercial’ views commerce as being 
specifically related to profit seeking activities.113 As opposed to the earlier definition, under 
this definition profit is an important characteristic of the term.  
 
In order to determine which of the two definitions of ‘commercial’ should be applied to Article 
I:3(c), Krajewski examines the context of the provision itself, as well as the use of the word 
‘commercial’ in the rest of the Agreement. In this regard Article XXVIII:(d) of the GATS is of 
particular importance.114 It provides a definition of the term ‘commercial presence’, which, as 
was explained above,115 is one of the modes of supply of services. The Article provides in part 
that:  
 
                                                   
108  Own emphasis 
109  Article XXVIII (b)  
110  Leroux E “What is a ‘Service Supplied in the Exercise of Governmental Authority’ under Article 1(3)(b) 
and (c) of the General Agreement on the Trade in Services? (2006) 40(3) Journal of World Trade 348. 
111  Krajewski M “Public Services and Trade Liberalisation: Mapping the legal framework” (2003) 6(2) Journal 
of International Economic Law 351. 
112  Ibid. 
113  Ibid. 
114  Article XXVIII contains key definitions of important concepts found in the agreement. 
115  See paragraph 2.3.1.2 
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(d) “commercial presence” means, any type of 
business or professional establishment, 
including through 
(i) The constitution, acquisition or 
maintenance of a juridical person, or 
(ii) the creation or maintenance of a branch 
or a representative office, within the 
territory of a Member for the purpose of 
supplying a service;  
 
Based on this wording, Krajewski suggests that “commercial” in the context of the GATS 
implies a ‘notion of profitability because business or professional establishments are usually 
set up to make a profit’.116 The conclusion, therefore, drawn from the text and the context is 
that services supplied on a commercial basis as provided by Article I:3(c) are services supplied 
on a profit seeking basis.117 
 
A similar conclusion is drawn by Van Duzer118 who, like Krajewski, concludes, based on 
readings of various dictionary definitions of the word commercial, that ‘it is arguably implicit 
in these definitions that services supplied on a commercial basis must be sold on a for-profit 
basis’.119 He, however, goes further than Krajewski by noting that the actual making of profit 
cannot be held as necessary to the meaning of the word.120 In other words, he argues that as 
long as a supplier has a bona fide intention to make profits the supply would be commercial 
even if profits were not made in fact.121  
 
The conclusions drawn by Krajewski and Van Duzer are however challenged by Aldung.122 
Aldung argues convincingly that Krajewski draws his conclusion from the definition of 
“commercial presence” provided in Article XXVIII:(d) without considering the examples that 
                                                   
116  Krajewski M “Public Services and Trade Liberalisation: Mapping the legal framework” (2003) 6(2) Journal 
of International Economic Law 351. 
117  Ibid. 
118  VanDuzer J “Health, Education and Social Services in Canada: The Impact of the GATS’, in John M. Curtis 
and Dan Ciuriak (eds), Trade Policy Research (2004), 287-518. 
119  Ibid. The author suggests the following definition for the word ‘profit’: exchanging services for revenues 
that exceed the cost of producing and supplying the service.  
120  Ibid. 
121  Ibid. 
122  Aldung R “Public Services and the GATS” (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 462. 
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complement this definition.123 These examples include ‘the constitution, acquisition or 
maintenance of a juridical person …’. “Juridical person” is in turn defined in paragraph (l) of 
the same Article as : ‘… any legal entity duly constituted or otherwise organised under 
applicable law, whether for profit or otherwise, and whether privately-owned or 
governmentally-owned …’.124  Aldung argues that the insertion of the phrase “or otherwise” in 
the definition of ‘judicial person’, indicates that public utilities and other non-profit 
organisations are not per se excluded from the scope of the definition of ‘commercial 
presence’, that is, mode 3 of supply of services, and, consequently, from the GATS.125 
 
Aldung further challenges the views expressed by Krajewski by questioning why, if the 
drafters of the GATS intended to focus solely on activities that were profit oriented, they did 
not explicitly state that in the Agreement.126  
 
The implication of the definitions favoured by Krajewski and VanDuzer for ‘public services’ is 
that they would not be considered as being provided on a commercial basis because in many 
countries the manner in which public services are supplied is not commercial in nature as 
defined above.127 With that said, it is, however, extremely important to note that many 
governments are increasingly commercializing the manner in which they supply public 
services. For example, public higher education institutions attempt to make a profit by, for 
example, charging foreign students higher fees.128 This could potentially bring public services 
under the scope of the GATS when they would otherwise have been excluded. 
 
2.3.2.2 ‘In competition’ 
 
The meaning of the phrase ‘in competition’ is equally contentious, and it has also been the 
subject of varying interpretations. As was the case with the term “commercial basis”, various 
authors have also employed the Vienna Convention’s interpretive rules in order to obtain an 
understanding of the meaning attributable to the phrase. It is also important to note, as was 
                                                   
123  Ibid. 
124  Emphasis added 
125  Ibid. 
126  Ibid. 
127  The manner in which public services, such as, health and education, are supplied in various countries will be 
considered in chapter 4 which examines case studies of selected countries.  
128  Ibid. see also Aldung R, “Public Services and the GATS” (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 
463 
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done when considering the meaning of ‘in competition,’ that the nature or identity of the 
services supplier is not of importance. In the context of the words ‘in competition,’ what is 
relevant is what is occurring in the market place in order to determine whether or not there is 
competition.129 The fact that a government service is supplying a particular service cannot 
warrant a conclusion that a service is not being supplied in competition with one or more 
services.130 
 
Krajewski suggests the following definition of ‘competition’: ‘competition exists where one 
producer targets the same market as at least one other producer’.131 This definition, however, 
raises more questions than answers. For example, Krajewski notes the following questions 
raised by the definition: 
 
‘Which is the relevant market? When are producers targeting the same 
market? It should be obvious that a situation of competition exists if two 
suppliers provide the same service for the same group of consumers. … 
[W]hat if the services are not exactly the same? For example, do two 
companies covering different parts of the rail network compete with each 
other? …Do public and private schools provide the same services, i.e. 
‘education’? Even if they do not provide the same service, do they 
nevertheless compete with each other’?132   
 
Van Duzer conducts a review of various dictionary definitions of ‘competition’ and suggests 
that for competition to exist ‘customers must be able to choose the supplier whose service they 
want to acquire and services must seek to attract customers from other suppliers’.133 He further 
suggests that for competition to exist, service suppliers must, in some sense, be substitutes for 
each other from the customer’s point of view.134 As was the case relative to Krajewski’s 
definition, important questions also arise from this definition. The key question that this 
definition raises is, when services should be considered substitutes for each other. 
                                                   
129  Leroux E “What is a ‘service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority’ under article 1(3)(b) and 
(c) of the General Agreement on the Trade in Services?” (2006) 40(3) Journal of World Trade 361. 
130  Ibid. 
131  Krajewski M “Public Services and Trade Liberalisation: Mapping the legal framework” (2003) 6(2) Journal 
of International Economic Law 352. 
132  Ibid. 
133  VanDuzer J “Health, Education and Social Services in Canada: The Impact of the GATS’, in John M. Curtis 
and Dan Ciuriak (eds), Trade Policy Research (2004), 388. 
134  VanDuzer J “Health, Education and Social Services in Canada: The Impact of the GATS’, in John M. Curtis 
and Dan Ciuriak (eds), Trade Policy Research (2004), 389. 
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Marchetti and Mavroidis also suggest that because the GATS is a commercial agreement, a 
commercial definition of the word competition must be used.135 Consequently they suggest 
the following definition: competition is ‘the effort of two or more parties, acting 
independently, to secure the business of a third party by the offer of the most favorable 
terms’.136 Like with the above definitions, the authors consider the question of what the 
relevant market is as a fundamental question. In other words, what are the boundaries within 
which the competition takes place?137  
 
In an attempt to find answers to the important questions raised above, various solutions have 
been proposed. Krajewski suggests that guidance can be sought from examining the manner in 
which similar provisions in the GATT have been interpreted.138 This position is criticised by 
Aldung who questions the relevance of the GATT jurisprudence to an agreement such as the 
GATS which covers more than just cross border trade.139  
 
Marchetti and Mavroidis argue that the expression ‘in competition with’ should be understood 
as competition between ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ services and service suppliers, 
based on the determination of the relevant product and geographic market.140 
VanDuzer, supported by Aldung, proposes a manner in which “in competition” can be 
understood. Their proposal is based firstly, on criticism which they level against the above 
mentioned definitions. They criticise the above definitions as solely hinging on the availability 
of alternative suppliers.141 The alternative provided by the two authors is described by them as 
“one-way” competition.142 In terms of this approach inferences on the existence of competition 
                                                   
135  Marchetti  J and Mavroidis P “What are the main challenges for the GATS framework? Don’t talk about 
revolution” (2004) European Business Organisation Law Review 531. 
136  Ibid. 
137  Ibid. 
138  In particular, he suggest that the manner in which article III:2 of the GATT which regulates taxation in the 
context of national treatment between ‘taxed products on the one hand and directly competitive or 
substitutable products on the other. He suggests that the meaning given to these word by the Appellant Body 
in the Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages be applied to the GATS Article I:3:(c). 
139  Aldung R, “Public Services and the GATS” (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 464. 
140  Marchetti J and Mavroidis P “What are the main challenges for the GATS framework? Don’t talk about 
revolution” (2004) European Business Organisation Law Review 534. 
141  Aldung R, “Public Services and the GATS” (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 465. 
142  See VanDuzer J “Health, Education and Social Services in Canada: The Impact of the GATS’, in John M. 
Curtis and Dan Ciuriak (eds), Trade Policy Research (2004) at pg 395; and Aldung R, “Public Services and 
the GATS” (2006) 445 Journal of International Economic Law  465. 
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would depend on the behaviour of the respective supplier.143 VanDuzer describes the 
implications of this approach as follows: 
 
‘This could mean that a service supplier must not operate with a view to 
competing with others for the supplier’s service to fall within the exclusion. 
So, for example, where a supplier supplies a service pursuant to an obligation 
to provide services to all eligible consumers and not because it seeks to 
increase its revenues by attracting more consumers, such as is the case with 
public schools, the service would not be supplied in competition with one or 
more service suppliers. Under this interpretation, it would be irrelevant if 
there were other suppliers, such as for profit private schools, who compete 
for students and the revenues they represent with each other and with public 
schools. For the services of public schools to be not in competition for the 
purposes of the governmental authority exclusion, all that would matter is 
whether the public schools themselves engage in competition’.144 
 
In practical terms, this means that only the actions of a supplier of public services would 
determine whether the services provided fall within the exclusion. For example, if a public 
university or hospital seeks to poach students or patients, then their actions can be 
characterised as being competitive.145   
 
2.3.2.3 Summary: Are public services covered  
 
Given the above interpretations, it can be seen clearly that no precise answer exists as to 
whether ‘public services’ fall under the GATS. This is not entirely due to the wording of 
Articles I:1(3)(b) and (c) but also because, as was pointed out earlier, what constitutes public 
services varies widely. Even if it is generally accepted that public services are usually 
supplied not for profit and not in competition with other services suppliers, government 
actions are increasingly changing, and these might bring these services within the scope of the 
GATS. This is especially true of the telecoms sector which has seen the privatisation of 
entities that were previously wholly under government control. Many governments have 
realised the importance of inviting investment in public services. This has led to a situation 
                                                   
143  Aldung R “Public Services and the GATS” (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 465. 
144  VanDuzer J “Health, Education and Social Services in Canada: The Impact of the GATS’, in John M. Curtis 
and Dan Ciuriak (eds), Trade Policy Research 2004 395. 
145  Aldung R “Public Services and the GATS” (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 465. 
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where these services are being provided in a similar manner to commercial enterprises, 
because investors oftentimes seek returns on their investments.146 It is also important to note 
that GATS Article XIX calls for the progressive liberalisation of services, which could mean 
that in the future these services might be brought within the scope of the Agreement.  
 
2.4 General obligations 
 
Once it is determined that particular services fall within the scope of the GATS, Part II of the 
Agreement contains general obligations and disciplines that are universally applicable to all 
measures within its scope.147 In other words, these provisions apply to all measures of WTO 
members affecting trade in services across all service sectors.148 There are several of these 
obligations that apply across all sectors but two are of particular importance.149 
 
First, Article II of the GATS sets out the important MFN treatment provisions.150 This 
provision, which is similar to Article I of the GATT, requires members to ‘accord 
immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member 
treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any 
other country’.151 Unlike the GATT, Article II:2 allows the GATS members to maintain 
exceptions to the MFN principle. 
 
A second important general obligation relates to transparency. This obligation is particularly 
important because, as was noted in the introduction to this study, services trade is primarily 
affected by the imposition of numerous domestic regulations. Article III accordingly requires 
members to promptly publish measures which pertain to or affect trade in services, to notify 
of regulatory changes in sectors where commitments have been made, to maintain enquiry 
                                                   
146  Hodge J, Liberalisation of Trade in Services in Developing Countries, in Mattoo and Englis (eds) (2002) 
Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook 221. 
147  Fidler, D et al, “Legal Review of the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS) from a health policy 
perspective” <http://whqlibdoc.who.int/gats/GATS_Legal_Review_eng.pdf> [accessed on 28 June 2007] 
61. 
148  Ibid. 
149  General obligations and disciplines include MFN (Article II), transparency (Article III), disclosure of 
confidential Information (Article III bis), economic integration (Article V), domestic regulation (Article VI), 
recognition (Article VII), security exceptions (Article XIV bis), and subsidies (Article XV).   
150  The MFN concept is considered a fundamental cornerstone of the world trading system. 
151  Article II:1 GATS 
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points which provide members with specific information, and to respond promptly to any 
queries posed to them.152 
 
In considering the horizontal obligations and disciplines of the GATS, it is extremely 
important to note that domestic regulation, which forms a central part of this thesis, is also 
listed among the general obligations. Even though this is the case, the wording of Article VI 
shows that not all of its provisions apply across all services.153 Many of its disciplines apply 
to domestic regulation where specific commitments have been made by members.154  
 
2.5  Specific commitments 
  
One of the most unique aspects of the GATS is the process by which Members assume 
specific liberalisation commitments through a process called scheduling.155 Schedules are 
documents in which individual countries identify sectors in respect of which they are prepared 
to agree to apply market access and NT obligations as well as exceptions from obligations 
which they would like to maintain.156 In making commitments countries do so for each of the 
four modes of supply discussed above.157  
 
There are several important observations that can be made regarding the GATS process of 
scheduling commitments. First, it is critical to note that countries are free to decide which 
service sectors they wish to subject to market access and NT.158 This means that if a country 
does not wish to, or is not ready to, open up a particular service sector, no obligation exists 
under the GATS for it to do so.159 This is a very important option available to countries who 
                                                   
152  UNCTAD/WTO (ITC) (2000) Business Guide to the General Agreement on Trade in Services 35. 
153  Wouters J and Coppens D (2006) “Domestic Regulation within the framework of the GATS” (2006) 
Institute of International Law Working Paper no 93 9. 
154  Ibid.  For example, Article VI:1 provides: ‘In sectors where specific commitments are undertaken each 
member shall ensure …’; Article VI:3 provides: ‘Where authorization is required for the supply of a service 
on which a specific commitment has been made …’; or Article VI:6: ‘In sectors where specific commitments 
regarding professional services are undertaken …’ (my emphasis) . 
155  UNCTAD/WTO (ITC) (2000) Business Guide to the General Agreement on Trade in Services 48. 
156  WTO Secretariat “Guide to reading the GATS schedules of commitments and the list of Article II (MFN) 
exemptions” <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm> [accessed on 26 June 2007]. 
Annexure C below contains the schedule of commitments that South Africa has made in the 
telecommunications sector.   
157  See para 2.3.1.2 above and fn 96. 
158  Chanda R “Social Services and the GATS: Key Issues and Concerns” (2003) 13(12) World Development 
1999. 
159  Ibid. 
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do not want to make commitments in sensitive and heavily government regulated service 
sectors.160 
  
Secondly, unlike under the GATT, there is no general obligation on member countries to 
extend either market access or NT to other members.161 Countries can, in their schedules, 
specify the limitations and exceptions they wish to maintain on market access and national 
treatment.162 The kinds of limitations that can be imposed by Members are listed in Article 
XVI GATS. They include: limitations on the number of service suppliers, limitations on the 
total value of service transactions or assets, limitations on the total number of service 
operations, limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a 
particular service sector, and limitations on the participation of foreign capital. 
 
In summary, the most critical observation that can be made about the GATS commitment 
mechanism is that it is highly voluntary and flexible.163 Members are not forced to open up 
any service sector, which means that, if a particular sector has sensitive concerns, members 
are free not to make any commitments in that sector. It can, therefore, be said that the GATS 
scheduling mechanism tries to strike a balance between commercial interests, on the one 
hand, and regulatory concerns and public policy objectives, on the other.164  
 
2.6  Conclusion 
 
It is now indisputable that services are trade commodities which play a significant part in the 
economies of many countries around the world. This is evident in the need that the WTO saw 
to develop rules to oversee trade in this sector. What is however less clear is whether public 
services are covered by the GATS. Irrespective of the interpretation one takes on the scope of 
the GATS, what is clear is that many governments’ actions in relation to public services are 
increasingly making these services subject to the provision of the GATS. 
 
                                                   
160  Ibid. 
161  UNCTAD/WTO (ITC) (2000) Business Guide to the General Agreement on Trade in Services 48. 
162  Chanda R “Social Services and the GATS: Key Issues and Concerns” (2003) 13(12) World Development 
1999. 
163  Ibid. 
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The following chapter focuses primarily on Article VI GATS which was meant to oversee 
domestic regulation as it relates to the trade in services. In particular the chapter will consider 
the work that in currently being done to develop disciplines on domestic regulation which are 
acceptable to all members of the WTO. 
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______________________________________________________ 
 
 CHAPTER 3  
DOMESTIC REGULATION – ARTICLE VI GATS 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 
3.1 Why the need for domestic regulation? 
 
In the introduction to this study it was noted that the international trade in services is 
particularly affected by the imposition of numerous domestic regulations.165 The possible 
meaning of the term “regulation” as it is used in the context of the GATS was also considered. 
This chapter seeks to explore, first, the general reasons for regulation, and secondly, the 
various tools and instruments used by countries to regulate, and which the disciplines on 
domestic regulation seek to address. This chapter also examines in some detail the structure 
and debates surrounding Article VI of the GATS.  
 
With regard to the reasons for regulation, two broad categories have been identified: 
economic reasons and political reasons. It is, however, important to note that the above 
categories are not mutually exclusive. Both categories can justify regulation, and oftentimes 
regulations are based on both reasons. In addition to the above rationale for regulation, other 
means of explaining the basis for regulation have been identified. For example, regulations 
are often imposed in the public interest.166 Countries employ regulatory policies to promote 
certain public interests in situations where, for example, an unregulated market would not 
necessarily deliver desirable social results.167 Also, regulatory policies can be developed to 
serve private rather than public interests.168  
 
3.1.1 Economic reasons for regulation 
 
The primary economic reason for regulation that has been identified by various authors is 
regulation to prevent “market failure”. Market failure is an economic term that refers to a 
                                                   
165  See paragraph 1.1 above 
166  Krajewski  M, (2003) National Regulation and Trade Liberalisation in Services: The Legal Impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy 12. 
167  Ibid. 
168  Ibid. 
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situation where an unregulated market does not deliver desired social results.169 Three kinds 
of problems, namely, natural monopolies, externalities, and information deficiencies, have in 
turn been identified as being the cause of market failure.170  
 
The first factor that can cause market failure, that is, natural monopolies, refers to a situation 
where goods or services require ‘relatively high fixed production costs compared to their 
demand’.171 This usually occurs in sectors where the supply of a good or service requires 
large networks in order to supply such goods or services effectively.172 These sectors require 
complex infrastructure, such as, rails for land transport, cables and satellites for 
communication, and pipes for water supply and sanitation.173 Examples of services which 
would require such large networks are water and energy services, rail transportation, and 
telecommunications. In such situations multiple firms providing services in a particular sector 
would be less efficient, that is, more costly to a nation or economy, than would be the case if 
fewer firms provided the services.174 In other words, the duplication of the networks required 
for these services is regarded as being inefficient because of, for example, the amount of 
physical space that is required to lay network cables or set-up reception towers for 
telecommunications. In addition, natural monopolies develop in these industries because of 
the large initial investments required to enter these sectors.175    
 
The result of a situation where natural monopolies exist is that competition is regarded as not 
being desirable or practical.176 The result of this is that services that require large distribution 
networks have been seen as sectors which require government regulation if they are to be 
provided efficiently.177 This is so because a natural monopoly might, for example, charge 
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users of its services in an unfair way because of the absence of a rival competitor. Regulation 
in these sectors is important to, for example, introduce competition. 
 
The second area that can lead to market failure and which would, therefore, require regulation 
is where externalities are present. In economics externalities are defined as a situation where a 
cost or benefit resulting from an economic transaction is borne by parties not directly 
involved in the transaction.178 Defined in another way, externalities occur when ‘the economic 
well-being of one person is directly affected by actions of another person and where market 
mechanism cannot internalise these effects’.179 The effects of an action of a third party can be 
positive or negative.180 An often cited example of a negative external effect is environmental 
pollution by a factory. The hazardous substances emitted from such a factory would 
negatively affect the wellbeing of people living in the vicinity of the factory.181 Even though 
this is the case, the cost to the lives of these people would not be reflected in the price of the 
products produced.182 In other words, the social cost of production is not reflected in price of 
the product. In such a case regulation can help by internalizing the negative effects by, for 
example, imposing specific taxes, charges or fees or by applying mandatory standards 
prohibiting pollution.183 
 
Thirdly, market failure can occur where there is an information deficit.184 An information 
deficit occurs in a situation when ‘buyers are not adequately informed about the true attributes 
of sellers’.185 This usually occurs largely in services, such as, financial services, professional 
services, or knowledge based services.186 Gamberale and Mattoo describe the problem posed 
by an information deficit and the importance of regulation in remedying this deficit as 
follows: 
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‘ … [C]onsumers cannot easily assess the competence of professionals such 
as doctors or lawyers, the safety of transport services, or the soundness of 
banks and insurance companies. In principle, the adequate dissemination of 
information can remedy the problem, but it may be too expensive to 
communicate the necessary information to individual buyers. In such a 
situation, it may be easier to regulate suppliers than educate consumers. The 
imposition of minimum regulatory conditions on suppliers reflects a certain 
uniformity of preferences among consumers about the quality of services. 
Thus regulators ensure that all banks meet a certain threshold of financial 
soundness and professionals a certain threshold of competence’.187 
 
3.1.2 Non-economic reasons for regulation 
 
In considering the reasons why governments regulate, non-economic reasons for regulation 
are particularly important because they are at the centre of much of the controversy that has 
surrounded Article VI of the GATS. Many of those who have voiced concerns about the 
potential negative effects of the GATS have done so in relation to the perceived effect that the 
GATS will have on members’ ability to regulate for non-economic reasons. Non-economic 
reasons are also especially important for developing countries because regulation in these 
countries is often aimed at achieving a wider range of objectives than purely economic 
ones.188  
 
 The non-economic reasons why countries regulate are based on the assumption that certain 
goals cannot be achieved through a properly functioning market process.189 Krajewski 
identifies two such goals, namely, distributional or social justice and community or ethical 
values.190 Regulation to achieve distributional justice stems from the fact that there is general 
consensus that market processes do not always result in a fair distribution of wealth and 
power.191 This, therefore, means that some degree of wealth and power distribution is seen as 
a valuable social goal.192  
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The main way in which countries try to evenly distribute the wealth and power disequilibrium 
created by the market is through fiscal regulatory measures.193 Examples of distributional 
tools include compulsory social security systems, or universal service obligations which 
require that services be supplied throughout an entire territory in a certain quality and at 
affordable prices.194 Universal Service Obligations’ (USO) are particularly important for 
developing countries because they can be an important tool in ensuring the attainment of 
various developmental objectives. USOs impose requirements that seek to ensure that either 
every individual member in a particular community can utilise a particular service (universal 
service), or that members of a particular community have access to a particular service 
through a common point, such as, for example, a public telephone (universal access).195  
 
With regard to the second group identified by Krajewski, that is, regulation for ethical values, 
the case between the United States and Antigua considered by the AB of the WTO196 provides 
an illustration of such regulations and the potential impact they can have on international 
trade. In this case Antigua challenged certain US Federal and State laws whose impact, 
according to Antigua, was to make the cross border supply of gambling and betting illegal, 
contrary to provisions of the GATS and to commitments undertaken by the United States 
under that Agreement. In responding to these challenges the United States argued that the 
challenged measures were necessary to protect “public morals” and “public order” within the 
meaning of Article XIV(a) of the GATS.197 In particular, they argued that the measures they 
had in place were there to protect minors from gambling, which was made easier by the forms 
of gambling services that Antigua, wanted to provide as well as to prevent the laundering of 
money garnered from organised crime. In assessing this defence, the Panel looked at the 
meaning of the terms “public morals” and “public order” and attributed to them their ordinary 
meaning when read in their context and in light of other WTO agreements. The panel noted 
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the sensitivities associated with interpreting these terms and remarked that their content could 
vary depending on a range of factors such as prevailing social, cultural, ethical, and religious 
values.198 In spite of this, the panel stated that “public morals” could be taken to mean 
‘standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or 
nation’.199 With regard to the meaning of “public order” they found that the term can be taken 
to mean ‘the preservation of the fundamental interest of society, as reflected in public policy 
and law’.200  The panel found that the measures in question were measures geared toward the 
protection of “public morals” and the maintenance of “public order” order in the United States 
but that they were not “necessary” to achieve their goals because other WTO-consistent 
alternatives had not been considered by the United States despite invitations to do so by 
Antigua.201  
 
3.2 Types of regulatory instruments employed by countries 
 
It is important to note at the outset that the types of instruments which governments utilise to 
regulate are numerous. The choice of instrument depends on the context of a particular 
country. What this section endeavors to do, is to highlight some common types of instruments 
that are used in regulation. Some of the instruments that will be considered include standards, 
price controls, and entry controls, such as, qualitative and quantitative measures.202 
 
3.2.1 Standards 
 
One of the most common forms of regulation employed by countries is the use of standards. 
Standards can be defined as ‘measures that lay down the characteristics of a service or the 
manner in which it is supplied’.203 They can also be defined as norms or requirements that 
establish uniform methods, processes or practices.204 Standards as an instrument of regulation 
can be employed in different ways and for various activities. For examples, standard can 
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prescribe a certain target which a producer must achieve while leaving the exact manner in 
which that target in achieved to the producer.205 A standard can also set performance 
requirements which would require a producer to fulfill certain defined quality conditions.206 
An example of a performance standard can be a requirement that responses to inquiries about 
services being provided be delivered in a timely manner.207 Such a requirement can 
specifically be enforced by requiring that at least a certain number of persons requesting 
responses must receive a final response from the first time they contact a service provider.208 
A third type of standard, which can be considered a little bit more stringent, is one which 
prescribes specific production methods and materials which must or must not be used in the 
production of a product.209 
 
3.2.2 Price controls 
 
A second type of regulatory instrument used by governments is price controls. Price controls 
can be defined as government dictated maximum or minimum prices of goods and services 
which are aimed at aimed at achieving diverse goals.210 Price controls can be applied in two 
ways. First, a specific price for a good or service can be prescribed to producers.211 For 
example, certain fixed fees that lawyers can charge can be prescribed or, as is the case in 
some countries, a maximum amount which landlords can charge their clients can also be 
prescribed.212 This type of price control is an important regulatory tool because it can ensure 
that there is income redistribution or an evening out of bargaining power.213 A second type of 
price control aims at limiting price increases either throughout the economy or within a 
particular sector. Krajewski notes that this form of regulation was an important regulatory tool 
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in Europe after the privatisation of government monopolies that provided services such as 
water, gas, electricity, and telecommunication services.214  
 
In the context of trade liberalisation of public services the importance of price control as a 
regulatory instrument cannot be overstated. Where countries schedule specific commitments 
in relation to these services, the ability of governments to set minimum prices for these 
essential services can ensure that essential policy objectives, such as, universal access, are 
achieved. 
 
3.2.3 Entry controls 
 
A third and important regulatory instrument is the use of entry controls. Entry controls require 
individuals and business to obtain authorisation before pursuing a certain activity.215 There 
are two general types of entry controls, namely, qualitative entry controls and quantitative 
entry controls. Qualitative requirements, which are especially important in the service sector 
are for example defined in current negotiating documents of the WPDR as, ‘substantive 
requirements relating to the competence of a natural person to supply a service’.216 
Quantitative requirements, on the other hand, allow individuals or business to do business 
only if a certain number of persons or activities are not exceeded.217  
 
3.2.4 Regulatory tools specifically mentioned in Article VI 
 
The current Article VI of the GATS explicitly mentions certain measures that the provisions 
on domestic regulation apply to. They include measures relating to qualification requirements 
and procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements and procedures. The latest 
negotiating draft of the Working Party on Domestic Regulation provides the following 
definitions of the abovementioned regulatory tools:218 
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"Licensing requirements" are substantive requirements, other than 
qualification requirements, with which a natural or a juridical person is 
required to comply in order to obtain, amend or renew authorisation to 
supply a service. 
 
"Licensing procedures" are administrative or procedural rules that a natural 
or a juridical person, seeking authorisation to supply a service, including the 
amendment or renewal of a license, must adhere to in order to demonstrate 
compliance with licensing requirements. 
 
"Qualification requirements" are substantive requirements relating to the 
competence of a natural person to supply a service, and which are required to 
be demonstrated for the purpose of obtaining authorisation to supply a 
service. 
 
"Qualification procedures" are administrative or procedural rules that a 
natural person must adhere to in order to demonstrate compliance with 
qualification requirements, for the purpose of obtaining authorisation to 
supply a service. 
 
"Technical standards" are measures that lay down the characteristics of a 
service or the manner in which it is supplied. Technical standards also 
include the procedures relating to the enforcement of such standards. 
 
These measures, as opposed to those mentioned in paragraph 3.2.1 – 3.2.4 above seem to be 
the primary target of future disciplines on domestic regulation. A document published by the 
WTO titled Examples of Regulatory Requirements Affecting Market Access for Professional 
Service Providers provides practical examples of domestic regulations that can affect various 
service sectors.219 The examples provided are helpful in further understanding the types of 
regulations that can impede services trade. Among the examples cited are: licensing 
requirements which, for example, require a minimum number of vessels for a provider of 
maritime services, or licensing procedures which require certification of papers necessary to 
establish a business but which take a long time to process, with no available alternative. Other 
examples provided include qualification requirements, which require fluency in the language 
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of the host country which in some cases is not relevant to ensure the quality of the service 
being delivered.220 
 
3.3 Article VI of the GATS – Domestic Regulation 
 
Having considered why and how governments regulate, an analysis of Article VI of the 
GATS which deals with domestic regulation can now be carried out. This Article is extremely 
important because it is the one where the delicate balance between the expansion of services 
trade liberalisation, on the one hand, and the preservation of regulatory autonomy, on the 
other, becomes visible.221 The primary goal behind this Article is to ensure that ‘trade-
restrictive measures that are not essential for the achievement of domestic regulatory 
objectives’ are identified.222  
 
Article VI can best be examined by dividing it into three broad categories. The first category 
covers subparagraphs 1-3. This category deals with measures of general application affecting 
trade in services where specific commitments have been made. The second category, 
subparagraph 5, sets out the manner in which issues relating to domestic regulation are to be 
dealt with pending the entry into force of disciplines on domestic regulation. The final 
category, subparagraph 4, sets out the mandate as well as guiding criteria for the development 
of new disciplines on domestic regulation. These three categories will be discussed in turn. 
 
3.3.1 Article VI: 1-3  
 
Article VI: 1-3 of the GATS provide that: 
 
1. In sectors where specific commitments are undertaken, each Member shall 
ensure that all measures of general application affecting trade in services are 
administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. 
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2. (a) Each Member shall maintain or institute as soon as practicable judicial, 
arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures which provide, at the 
request of an affected service supplier, for the prompt review of, and where 
justified, appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting trade in 
services. Where such procedures are not independent of the agency entrusted 
with the administrative decision concerned, the Member shall ensure that the 
procedures in fact provide for an objective and impartial review.  
(b) The provisions of subparagraph (a) shall not be construed to require a 
Member to institute such tribunals or procedures where this would be 
inconsistent with its constitutional structure or the nature of its legal system. 
 
3.  Where authorisation is required for the supply of a service on which a 
specific commitment has been made, the competent authorities of a Member 
shall, within a reasonable period of time after the submission of an 
application considered complete under domestic laws and regulations, 
inform the applicant of the decision concerning the application. At the 
request of the applicant, the competent authorities of the Member shall 
provide, without undue delay, information concerning the status of the 
application. 
 
The first observation that can be made about the wording of the above provisions is that they 
deal mainly with the procedural aspects of domestic regulation and not with their actual 
substance. The provisions require that, where specific commitments have been undertaken by 
a country, such country has an obligation to ensure that all ‘measures of general application’ 
are administered in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner.223 This was confirmed in 
the DSB Panel Report in United States – Measures Affecting Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services (US – Gambling),224  where the Panel had the opportunity to 
consider whether the United States was in violation of Articles VI: 1 and 3 of the GATS, as 
was alleged by the complainant Antigua. The Panel noted, importantly, that Article VI: 1 did 
not apply to the substantive content of measures of general application but rather to their 
administration.225 The Panel also highlighted the fact that Article VI: 3 dealt with 
‘transparency and due process obligations with respect to the processing of applications for 
authorisation to supply services in a sector where specific commitments have been 
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undertaken’226 therefore underscoring the fact that the provisions of Articles VI: 1 and 3 dealt 
with procedural matters.  
 
Delimatsis makes insightful observations about the significance of the abovementioned 
provisions. He notes that, taken together, the first three paragraphs of Article VI introduce 
into the GATS the concept of due process with principles, such as, nemo iudex in causa sua 
and audi alteram partem, which, though present in the public law of most countries, are now 
introduced at the multilateral level.227 He further notes that:  
 
‘…what the GATS does is to create multilaterally established private rights 
against national public administrators and regulators and to add a multilateral 
level of scrutiny as regards the adherence of national regulatory and 
administration authorities to the rule of law and due process in an origin-
neutral manner’.228 
 
On a more specific note, the WTO’s adjudicating bodies have had the opportunity on several 
occasions to interpret the meaning of the term ‘measure of general application’ as used in 
Article VI: 1 but in the context of the GATT. These interpretations can provide an indication 
of the meaning of the phrase in the context of Article VI. In the US – Underwear229 case the 
Appellant Body (AB) found that, to the extent that a restraint affects an unidentified number 
of economic operators, including domestic and foreign producers, such a measure would be a 
‘measure of general application’. Furthermore, in the Japan – Film case the Panel, in 
interpreting the same term, noted that the term ‘general application’ could also cover 
administrative rulings in individual cases where such rulings establish or reverse principles or 
criteria applicable in future cases.230 It is worth mentioning that in the context of the GATS, 
the word ‘measure’ is specifically defined as was discussed in paragraph 2.3.1.1 above.  
 
A final important observation regarding Articles VI:1-3 is that the due process obligations 
imposed by these sections only apply where specific commitments have been undertaken by a 
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Member. This distinction sets Article VI apart from similar provisions, such as, Article III 
(Transparency), contained in the GATS. 231 It is also important to note that the WTO 
adjudicating bodies have also interpreted the specific content of the standards set in these 
provisions for the administration of measures of general application, that is, reasonableness, 
objectivity, and impartiality.232 
 
3.3.2 Article VI: 5 – Provisional arrangements on domestic regulation 
 
It was noted earlier that the provisions of Article VI are provisional in nature. In the period 
leading up to the creation of new disciplines on domestic regulation, Article VI: 5 governs 
issues regarding licensing, qualifications, and technical standards. This Article provides in 
part that, pending the entry into force of new disciplines, members are not to apply licensing 
and qualification requirements and technical standards, inter alia, in a manner that is not 
based on objective and transparent criteria, such as, competence and the ability to supply a 
service in a manner that is not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the 
service. It is important to note that the provisions of Article VI: 5, like other provisions of 
Article VI, apply to service sectors where WTO members have made specific commitments in 
those sectors.  
 
Importantly, Article VI:5 (a) (ii) provides that the application of these provisional disciplines 
should not be applied in a manner which ‘could not reasonably have been expected of that 
Member at the time the specific commitments in those sectors were made’. This paragraph 
has a significant effect on licensing procedures and technical standards in that it retains in 
place already existing measures which members might reasonably have expected at the time 
of making their GATS commitments.233 Delimatsis notes that such measures would include 
measures already in existence at the time GATS came into force, which has the effect of 
grandfathering pre-existing domestic regulations.234 The provisional arrangements are also 
significant because they provide in paragraphs (b) that, ‘in determining whether a Member is 
                                                   
231  Delimatsis P, “Due process and ‘Good’ regulation embedded in the GATS – Disciplining regulatory 
behavior in services through article VI of the GATS” (2006) 10(1) Journal of Economic Law 19. 
232  See Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and Import of Finished 
Leather (Argentine – Hides and Leather), WT/DS155/R, adopted 16 February 2001.  
233  Delimatsis P, “Due process and ‘Good’ regulation embedded in the GATS – Disciplining regulatory 
behavior in services through article VI of the GATS” (2006) 10(1) Journal of Economic Law 40. 
234  Ibid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47
in conformity with the obligations under paragraph 5(a), account shall be taken of 
international standards of relevant international organisations applied by that Member’. The 
significance of this provision will be considered below.  
 
3.3.3 Article VI: 4 – Mandate for future disciplines 
 
Perhaps the most important provision of Article VI is paragraph 4. This paragraph is 
significant because it sets the mandate for the creation of new disciplines that will ensure that 
domestic regulations, such as, qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, 
and licensing requirements, do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade. The wording of 
Article VI:4 specifically provides that:  
 
With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements 
and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not 
constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in 
Services shall, through appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any 
necessary disciplines. Such disciplines shall aim to ensure that such 
requirements are, inter alia:  
 
(a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as 
competence and the ability to supply the service; 
(b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality 
of the service; 
(c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a 
restriction on the supply of the service.   
 
In order to fulfil the mandate to establish disciplines “through appropriate bodies”, as set out 
in Article VI:4, the CTS began by first focusing on regulatory measures for trade in 
professional services. To do this the CTS created the Working Party on Professional Services 
(WPPS). The decision to create this group was taken in a Ministerial Decision235 that was 
adopted at the same time that the GATS came into effect. This decision recognised the 
particular impact that regulatory measures had on professional services and decided that, as a 
matter of priority, the WPPS should develop multilateral disciplines in the accountancy 
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sector to give effect to commitments that had already been made in this sector.236 These were 
the first steps that were taken toward fulfilling the mandate set out in Article VI:4. The 
accountancy disciplines are important to consider because even though they dealt specifically 
with the accounting sector, they stand as a model for future disciplines that are to be 
negotiated for all service sectors where members have made commitments. 
 
The WPPS completed its work on accountancy disciplines in April 1999. These disciplines, 
which describe their purpose as ‘to facilitate trade in accountancy services by ensuring that 
domestic regulations affecting trade in accountancy services meet the requirements of article 
VI:4’,237 have several main elements. These elements include, first, the inclusion of a 
necessity test. Paragraph II:2 of these disciplines requires Members to ensure that measures, 
such as, licensing requirements and technical standards, ‘are not more restrictive than 
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective’.238 Examples of legitimate objectives provided in 
the disciplines include: protecting consumers, ensuring quality service, ensuring that the 
persons providing the service are adequately qualified, and ensuring the integrity of the 
profession.239 The inclusion of such a test is obviously significant because it acts as a tool 
with which a balance between preserving the freedom of members to set and achieve 
regulatory goals and checking the use of measures that unduly restrict international trade.240  
 
A second important element contained in the accountancy disciplines was a transparency 
requirement which obliges members to explain, upon request, ‘the specific objectives and 
rationale intended by their regulations’.241 As was noted earlier, this transparency provision is 
different from those contained in Article III of the GATS which apply to all measure of 
general application pertaining to the GATS.  The disciplines also require Members to make 
all information regarding licensing requirements and procedures public, to provide interested 
parties with an opportunity to comment on proposed regulations, and to consider comments 
                                                   
236  Ibid para 1. 
237  WTO, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, S/L/64 17 December 1998 paragraph 
I. 
238  WTO, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, S/L/64, 17 December 1998paragprah 
II:2. 
239  Industry Canada, GATS 2000 and Rules Governing Domestic Regulations: GATS Article VI:4 in Context, 
[accessed, <http://www.international.gc.ca/assets/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/pdfs/domestic_e.pdf> [accessed on 19 August 2008].  
240  WTO Secretariat, “Necessity test” in the WTO, S/WPDR/W/27, 2 December 2003. 
241  Ibid. 
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made by interested parties.242 The final significant element provided by the accountancy 
disciplines was the requirement placed on Members to ensure that due process in processing 
applications is followed.  
 
After developing the accountancy disciplines the WPPS was abolished and another body, the 
WPDR, with an expanded mandate, was created.243 The WPDR was tasked with developing 
generally applicable disciplines as well as disciplines that would be applicable to individual 
sectors or groups.244  
 
3.4 WPDR and progress on Article VI:4 Mandate 
 
The WPDR performs its work as a subsidiary of the CTS, which is the main body responsible 
for the functioning of the GATS. It is overseen by a chairman whose primary task is to 
attempt to reach consensus among countries divergent views on proposed new disciplines.245 
Since the establishment of the WPDR in 1999, no agreement has yet been reached on future 
disciplines. There have, however, been four draft proposals which have been circulated and 
discussed by Members, without consensus being achieved. These proposals are circulated by 
the chairman of the WPDR and they contain a reflection of progress of the negotiations. The 
latest draft was circulated on 23 January 2008. 
 
The lack of consensus on futures disciplines stems from the conflicting views held by 
Members with regard to the various issues that surround domestic regulation. These views 
range from those of Members who want ambitious disciplines which would see domestic 
regulation used only when ‘necessary’, to others which see such a test as having the potential 
to undermine legitimate regulatory authority.246 Proponents of the former view include 
Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Switzerland, while those who hold the latter view 
include Brazil, the Philippines and the Africa Group.247  
 
                                                   
242  Ibid. 
243  See Decision on Domestic Regulation, S/L/70, 28 April 1999. This decision replaced the WPPS with the 
WPDR.  
244  Ibid.  
245  Robert Stumberg, WPDR Chairman’s fourth draft on Domestic Regulation, dated 23 January 2008, 1 
Memorandum Harrison Institute for Public Law George Town University, February 12 2008, 5.    
246  Ibid. 
247  Ibid. 
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Concerted effort was put into reaching agreement after the third draft of the WPDR. 
Members held extensive discussions between June and December 2007 but were unable to 
reach consensus.248 In the text of the Fourth Draft the chairman of the WPDR noted the 
persistent differing views that prevented consensus during discussions of the third text and 
indicated the need for further negotiations on these issues, based on the Fourth Draft 
proposal.249  
 
One of the issues that has caused persistent problems during the negotiation process has been 
whether a necessity test should form part of future disciplines.  
 
3.4.1  A “necessity” test as a stumbling block to future disciplines  
 
In general, necessity tests250 are used to establish the consistency of a particular measure with 
WTO law ‘based on whether the measure is “necessary” to achieve certain policy 
objectives’.251 According to the WTO Secretariat necessity tests can be viewed as containing 
three elements: 
 
‘…first, the measure that is subject to the test; second, the objective 
which the measure seeks to achieve; and third, the link of necessity 
between the measure and the objective’. 252  
 
As noted above, necessity tests strive to strike a balance between preserving the freedom of 
Members to achieve regulation through measures of their choosing and discouraging 
Members from maintaining measures that unduly restrict international trade.253 Despite the 
potential usefulness of this tool, it has generated a lot of controversy primarily because those 
who oppose its use view it as being unable to sufficiently guarantee a country’s right to 
regulate. Those who hold this view justify their concerns by pointing to the manner in which 
this test has been received by WTO dispute resolution bodies in various cases considered by 
                                                   
248  Robert Stumberg, WPDR Chairman’s fourth draft on Domestic Regulation, dated 23 January 2008, 1 
Memorandum Harrison Institute for Public Law George Town University, February 12 2008, 6. 
249  Working Party on Domestic Regulations, Revised Draft, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Pursuant to 
GATS Article VI:4, 23 January 2008. 
250  It is important to note that necessity tests are contained in various agreements of the WTO such as the 
GATT, the GATS, the Annex on Telecommunication, the TBT, the SPS, and the TRIPS. 
251  WTO Secretariat, “Necessity test” in the WTO, S/WPDR/W/27, 2 December 2003 paragraph 4. 
252  WTO Secretariat, “Necessity test” in the WTO, S/WPDR/W/27, 2 December 2003 paragraph 5. 
253  WTO Secretariat, “Necessity test” in the WTO, S/WPDR/W/27, 2 December 2003 paragraph 4. 
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them. In the overwhelming majority of cases, with the exception of one,254 considered by 
them where a party had sought to rely on the necessity test, WTO dispute settlement bodies 
have rejected the application of the test. This, according to detractors of the test, suggests that 
under WTO jurisprudence it is virtually impossible for a country to justify a challenged 
measure as ‘necessary’, even when such measures concerns health or the environment which 
are legitimate objectives under several WTO agreements.255 Accordingly, they view the 
necessity test as a ‘wholly deficient and discredited defense’.256 Those who support the use of 
a necessity test argue that it is important in preventing the use of regulations to avoid trade 
obligations. 
 
The stumbling block that this test has caused for negotiations can be seen in the positions that 
have been articulated by various members during the course of negotiations. The United 
States, for example, has made it clear in a document outlining its position on a draft text 
circulated by the chairman, that it does not support any type of operational necessity test or 
standard in any new disciplines on domestic regulation.257 The African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries (ACP)258 hold the view that the adoption of a necessity test would not 
guarantee enough flexibility to safeguard national policy objectives and the different ways 
available to achieve them.259 As a result they are of the view that, in order to ensure 
developing countries the full right to regulate, they should not be subject to a necessity test in 
future Article VI disciplines.  
 
Those opposed to the use of a necessity test for future disciplines seem to have the upper 
hand in the ongoing negotiations. The current draft text omits a necessity test which earlier 
                                                   
254  European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos- Containing Products, Appellant Body 
Report, Wt/DS/135/AB/R. 
255  Michelle Swenarchuck, General Agreement on Trade in Services: Negotiations Concerning Domestic 
Regulations under GATS Article VI(4), 1 Canadian Environmental Law Association, November 2000, 5.  
256  Michelle Swenarchuck, General Agreement on Trade in Services: Negotiations Concerning Domestic 
Regulations under GATS Article VI(4), 1 Canadian Environmental Law Association, November 2000, 1. 
257  United States Trade Representative, ‘Outline of the U.S Position on a Draft Consolidated Text in the 
WPDR’ Job (06)/223 (July 11 2006), B.3, <http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=88410> 
[accessed August 29, 2008].  
258  The African, Caribbean and Pacific states are states which were associated with the European Community 
through the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement which gave them preferential access to the European 
Community markets and other benefits (Goode, W (2003) Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms 3.) This 
Agreement has subsequently been replaced by a new regime where blocks of countries are to negotiate 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the European Union.  
259  Communication from ACP Group, Pro Development Principles for GATS Article VI:4 Negotiations, 
JOB(06)/136/Rev.1,19 June 2006, C.10, <http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=88212> 
[accessed on 29 August 2008].  
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drafts contained.  In place of such a test negotiating Members have introduced a different 
measure that can serve to assuage the concerns of proponents of a necessity test. The new 
measure, outlined in the purpose section of the agreement, states that regulations should not 
constitute disguised restrictions to trade in services. Paragraph I:2 of the 2008 draft proposals 
provides:260 
 
‘The purpose of these disciplines is to facilitate trade in services by 
ensuring that measures relating to licensing requirements and 
procedures, qualification requirements and procedures, and technical 
standards are based on objective and transparent criteria, such as 
competence and the ability to supply the service, and do not constitute 
disguised restrictions on trade in services’. (own emphasis). 
 
This wording is not an innovation of the WPDR as it has actually been used in various other 
WTO agreements.261 In fact, the AB has had the opportunity in the US – Gasoline case to 
interpret the meaning of this phrase in the context of the GATT.262 The AB found that 
‘disguised restrictions’ include disguised discrimination in international trade and that the 
term also embraced restrictions amounting to ‘arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination’.263  
The inclusion of this phrase in the purpose section of the draft text is significant in that that 
phrase does not impose an obligation which Members are required to fulfil, but rather 
provides an interpretive guideline which could influence future disciplines.264  
 
3.4.2 Issues of particular relevance for developing countries 
 
Like other WTO agreements, issues relating to special and differential treatment (S&D)265 
for developing countries (DCs) and least developed countries (LDCs) have called for 
particular attention during negotiations on future disciplines. In the context of domestic 
                                                   
260  Working Party on Domestic Regulations, Revised Draft, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation pursuant to 
GATS Article VI:4, 23 January 2008. 
261  See inter alia GATS Art. VII:3 (Recognition), GATT Art. XX (Conditions for Evoking General Exceptions) 
and GATS Art. XIV(General Exceptions).   
262  United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US-Gasoline), Appellant Body 
Report, WT/DS/2/AB/R pg 28.  
263  US Gasoline paragraph 10 
264  Michelle Swenarchuck, General Agreement on Trade in Services: Negotiations Concerning Domestic 
Regulations under GATS Article VI(4), 1 Canadian Environmental Law Association, November 2000, 7. 
265  This is a term used in WTO parlance to describe preferential treatment in favour of developing and least 
developed countries.  
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regulation, the particular concerns that give rise to the need for S&D treatment stem from 
realities, such as, ‘weak regulatory infrastructures, low government resources (financial, 
technical, and human), and small size service providers striving to upgrade their services’.266 
These realities are highlighted in the Preamble of the GATS which recognises ‘asymmetries 
existing with respect to the degree of development of services regulations in different 
countries, and the particular need this creates for developing countries to exercise the right to 
regulate’.267  
 
As a result of these weak regulatory capacities DCs and LDCs have proposed measures 
which they think can allow them the necessary flexibility to pursue their development 
objectives, as well as ensure that they can serve their export markets and, therefore, benefit 
from service trade.268 These proposals include:269 first, the complete exemption of LDCs 
from any future disciplines; secondly, future disciplines should include specific and 
operational S&D provisions which should include the extent and timing of DCs obligations’ 
to comply with the disciplines;270 and thirdly, and especially important for these countries, 
the inclusion of provisions that ensure that technical assistance and capacity building is 
granted. According to the Africa group, such technical assistance should be aimed at the 
following:271 
 
(a) to assist developing country regulators to build the regulatory and 
institutional framework in their countries 
(b) to assist service suppliers and regulators in developing countries 
to comply with these disciplines and to apply them 
                                                   
266  Communication by the African Group on Domestic Regulation, Pro Develoment Principles for GATS 
Article VI:4 Negotiations <http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/library.cfm?refID=80780> [accessed on 30 
August 2008] May 2006 paragraph I(1). 
267  World Trade Organisation, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994. 
268  Communication by the African Group on Domestic Regulation, Pro Develoment Principles for GATS 
Article VI:4 Negotiations <http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/library.cfm?refID=80780> [accessed on 30 
August 2008] May 2006 paragraph I(1). 
269  It is important to note that these proposals are taken from a document of the ACP group. Even though the 
list of LDCs and DCs includes countries that are not in this group, countries from this group make up a large 
percentage of the group and the document is, therefore, used as a reflection of the position of the LDCs in 
particular.  
270  Communication by the African Group on Domestic Regulation, Pro Develoment Principles for GATS 
Article VI:4 Negotiations <http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/library.cfm?refID=80780> [accessed on 30 
August 2008] May 2006 paragraph 20. 
271  Communication by the African Group on Domestic Regulation, Pro Develoment Principles for GATS 
Article VI:4 Negotiations <http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/library.cfm?refID=80780> [accessed on 30 
August 2008] May 2006 paragraph 22. 
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(c) to assist services suppliers in upgrading their services (including 
their quality and competitiveness, as well as their qualifications) 
to effectively compete in an ever more demanding global services 
market 
(d) to assist policy makers and service suppliers in developing 
countries to effectively participate in international standard 
setting processes in an informed and sustained manner 
 
In addition to this it has also been proposed that in preparing and applying measures covered 
by future disciplines, developed countries should take into account the special 
developmental, financial, and trade  needs of developing Members.272 Practically this would 
entail, for example, phased introduction of new measures, granting of longer time frames for 
compliance by DCs Members, and granting of concessional fees to DC service exporters.273  
 
The current negotiating draft recognises the particular difficulties associated with DCs and 
LDCs compliance with future disciplines and it, therefore, devotes a specific section to 
addressing these issues. The draft text contains provisions that exempt DCs from applying 
future disciplines for a particular period of time to be determined once the final text is agreed 
upon. Provision is made for the possibility of extending such exemption period. Furthermore, 
reduced administrative fees, long phase in periods, and technical assistance are all provided 
for. Commitment to S&D measures for future disciplines also seems to have the support of 
some of the major world powers. The US, for example, in a paper outlining its position on 
the draft consolidated text, supports a realistic and practical approach to recognising the 
different levels of development among Members.274 Similarly, China and Pakistan have also 
voiced support for provisions like those contained in the current draft text.  
 
3.4.3 Other key issues for future disciplines 
 
Besides the issue of a necessity test and the specific issues facing DCs and LDCs, there are 
several other issues surrounding domestic regulation that Members continue to negotiate 
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over. Some of these issues, which will be discussed briefly, include: international standards, 
equivalence or mutual recognition, and transparency requirements. 
 
3.4.3.1 International Standards 
 
One of the measures to which future disciplines on domestic regulation will be targeted is 
technical standards. An important issue regarding the disciplining of technical standards that 
has been debated by the WPDR is the role and use of international standards for future 
disciplines.275 It is important to note at the outset that the WTO has ‘no direct role either in 
promoting the creation of technical standards or in specifying their content’.276 Despite this, 
international standards have been used in various ways in various WTO agreements. The use 
of international standards is contentious primarily because of their potential impact on 
national regulatory freedom. The impact that international standards have on regulatory 
freedom depends on the manner in which such standards are used. One of the ways in which 
these standards can be used is by establishing a presumption in favour of such standards, an 
example of which is Article 3.2 of the SPS.277 A second way in which international standards 
have been used in WTO agreements is by requiring Members to use international standards 
for national regulations or requiring them to base regulations on international standards.278 
For example, both Articles 3.1 and 2.4 of the SPS and TBT, respectively, use the peremptory 
word ‘shall’ when referring to the use of international standards.279 Where standards are used 
                                                   
275  Krajewski, M (2003) National Regulation and Trade Liberalisation in Services: The Legal Impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy 146. 
276  Dale Honeck, The WTO and Technical Standards in Services, 
<www.iso.org/iso/livelinkgetfile?llNodeId=21793&llVolId=-2000> [accessed on 3 September 2008] 
September 2005. 
277 Krajewski M (2003) National Regulation and Trade Liberalisation in Services: The Legal Impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy 146. Article 3.2 of the 
SPS provides that:  
‘Sanitary and phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life, and 
presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994.’ 
278  Ibid. 
279  Article 3.1 of the SPS provides: To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as 
possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines 
or recommendations, where they exist…’ Article 2.4 of the TBT, on the other hand, provides: ‘Where 
technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their completion is imminent, 
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in the abovementioned ways regulatory freedom is greatly reduced, and it can be extremely 
difficult for Members to defend any deviation from an international standard.280 
 
A final way in which international standards can be used is by establishing an obligation to 
take international standards into account.281 As opposed to the two examples mentioned 
above, this type of obligation has a less intrusive effect on national regulatory autonomy.  
Article VII of the Accountancy disciplines employs this type of obligation in dealing with 
technical standards.   
 
In the context of the current work of the WPDR, the WTO Secretariat has previously 
expressed a view that supports the use of a presumption in favour of international standards 
in future domestic regulation disciplines.282 In its view the application of such a test can 
‘facilitate the application of the necessity test and would also constitute a strong incentive for 
the use of international standards’.283 This view is also supported by various WTO Members, 
such as, Switzerland who have submitted a detailed proposal on the issue, and by authors 
who have written on the issues of future disciplines.284 From the perspective of DCs and 
LDCs this position creates difficulties. For example, even though these countries are 
sometimes members of international standard setting institutions, they are unable to 
adequately participate in these institutions because of lack of capacity, which effectively 
means that they do not participate in developing the standards to which they will be held.285 
Furthermore, the standards developed at the international level are often unattainable for 
many DCs and LDCs. The latest draft negotiation of the WPDR seems to have opted for a 
minimally intrusive reference to international standards. It uses the word ‘should’ as opposed 
to ‘shall’ that was used in previous drafts. 
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3.4.3.2 Equivalence or Mutual Recognition  
 
One of the critical areas that Article VI:4 disciplines will address relates to qualification 
requirements and procedures. In particular, future disciplines will have to address the issue of 
recognition as it relates to qualification requirements and procedures.286 Recognition can 
have a considerable impact on trade in services especially where professional services are 
being traded. Despite the potential impact that recognition (or lack thereof) can have on trade 
in services, the GATS does not contain any explicit requirements on recognition.287 This is 
understandable due to the regulatory diversity that exists among GATS members which can 
make mutual recognition extremely hard to achieve.288 The GATS, however, authorises and 
regulates plurilateral recognition agreements among its members, which are sometimes 
referred to as mutual recognition arrangements.289 Such mutual recognition agreements are 
based on the concept of equivalence. Equivalence can be defined as the requirement that 
‘where a host country’s regulatory goals are addressed by home country regulation, the host 
country should accept the home country’s regulation as equivalent’.290 Put differently, a 
service supplier who has already met certain criteria in his home country should not be asked 
to meet the same criteria again.291 It is important to note that equivalence should not be 
confused with harmonisation which involves the adoption of a single standard or 
qualification requirement by two or more countries.292  
 
Similar obligations are used in other WTO agreements, such as, Articles 2.7 and 4.1 of the 
TBT and the SPS respectively. Importantly, the Accountancy Disciplines, which, as 
                                                   
286  ‘Recognition’ refers to the act of acknowledgement by one country of the qualifications, standards, licence 
requirements or testing methods of another country (Goode, W (2003) Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms 
290.) 
287  Joel P. Trachtman, Lessons for the GATS from existing WTO Rules on Domestic Regulation, in A. Mattoo 
and P. Save (eds) Domestic Regulation and Services Trade Liberalisation 75. 
288  Wouters J and Coppens D (2006) “Domestic Regulation within the Framework of the GATS” Institute of 
International Law Working Paper No 93 49. 
289  Article VII provides: ‘…a Member may recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements met, 
or licenses or certifications granted in a particular country. Such recognition, which may be achieved 
through harmonization or otherwise, may be based upon arrangement with the country concerned or may be 
accorded autonomously.  
290 Julia Nielson, Short Cut or Long Road? Equivalence, International Standards and the GATS, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/workshop_march04_e/sess2_nielson_oecd1_e.ppt#256,1,Short 
cut or long road?  Equivalence, international standards and the GATS> [accessed 4 September 2008].  
291  Krajewski M (2003) National Regulation and Trade Liberalisation in Services: The Legal impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy 147. 
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mentioned, earlier serve as a blueprint for future disciplines, make provision for recognition. 
Paragraph 19 of these Disciplines provides that:  
‘A Member shall ensure that its competent authorities take account of 
qualifications acquired in the territory of another Member, on the basis of 
equivalency of education, experience and/or examination requirement’. 
This obligation stems from the recognition by Members of the ‘the role which mutual 
recognition agreements can play in facilitating the process of verification of qualifications 
and/or in establishing equivalency of education’.293  
 
Krajewski notes that, in the context of future disciplines for domestic regulations, the concept 
of equivalence may play an important note in facilitating trade in services, without restricting 
regulatory autonomy.294 He, however, argues that this will depend on who decides the 
question of equivalence. In his opinion, if equivalence is determined solely by national 
authorities without a WTO dispute settlement organ questioning this decision, then 
regulatory autonomy would largely remain intact whereas regulatory autonomy would be 
affected in the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies could question these decisions.295  
 
3.4.3.3 Transparency requirements 
 
Transparency refers to the ‘degree to which trade policies and practices, and the process by 
which they are established, are open and predictable’.296 In the context of trade in services 
transparency is extremely important because of the high regulatory nature of services, the 
opaqueness sometimes attached to the regulatory process, and the regulatory discretion 
involved in adopting, implementing, and administering standards, procedures and 
regulations.297 It is important to note at the outset that the issue of Transparency is dealt with 
under a separate heading of the Agreement. Article III GATS, titled transparency, deals with 
all measures of general application which pertain to or affect the operation of the GATS. It is 
                                                   
293  WTO Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, S/L/64, 17 December 1998 para. 21. 
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important to differentiate these provisions from those that Article VI: 4 disciplines will cover. 
The disciplines being negotiated under the WPDR will cover all measures of general 
application relating to licensing requirements and procedures, qualification requirements and 
procedures, and technical standards affecting the trade in services sector where specific 
commitments have been undertaken. This distinction is not always apparent because Article 
VI and Article III dealing with Transparency are both part of Part II of the GATS which 
contains rules that are applicable across all sectors. 
 
A significant issue related to transparency obligations that has been debated in the WPDR 
concerns the ability of other Members to comment on proposed measures affecting licensing 
and qualification requirements as well as technical standards. In a proposal on transparency 
put forward by the US, it suggested that Members should publish all relevant measures that 
relate to the scope of Article VI, and give all interested parties a reasonable opportunity to 
comment.298 The proposal also suggests that Members should address in writing substantive 
issue raised in these comments.299  
 
This proposal has been resisted particularly by DCs who argue that it is too intrusive of their 
regulatory decision making process.300 In particular, the ACP Group has noted that such 
requirements may be: 
 
‘… contrary to constitutional structures and legal systems in many 
developing countries as well as result in granting foreign-service suppliers 
opportunities to exert undue pressure on domestic decision making process, 
which is the core of sovereignty’.301 
 
In addition to concerns relating to sovereignty, objections to such transparency requirements 
also stem from issues related to cost.  It has been noted that the most costly aspect of the 
GATS for DCs relate to transparency obligations. Proposal such as that of the US can only 
add to the burden of DCs in this regard. They have, therefore, proposed transparency 
                                                   
298  WTO Document Code JOB (06) /182, Horizontal Transparency Disciplines in Domestic Regulation, June 9 
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obligation which are general in nature and which are in line with their capacity.302 The 
current WPDR draft does not incorporate the proposals of the US but rather contains 
provisions which would be closer to the position advocated for by DCs.  
 
3.5 Relationship between Article VI, market access, and national treatment 
 
In addition to domestic regulation, two other provisions of the GATS aim to ensure that 
international trade in services is not hindered by countries’ protectionist measures. These 
provisions, namely, market access and national treatment, are considered fundamental 
principles of the international trading system and can also be found in almost all WTO 
agreements. Broadly defined, ‘market access’ in the WTO framework is a term outlining 
government imposed conditions under which a product may enter a country under non-
discriminatory conditions, whereas national treatment requires that a country give others’ 
goods and services the same treatment that it gives its own, once they are within its 
territory.303 The interaction between these three provisions, and, in particular, the interaction 
between market access (Article XVI) and domestic regulation (Article VI), has remained 
extremely unclear and controversial. One author has referred to this interaction as the 
‘thorniest systemic issue in the GATS today’.304 This issue is contentious because a particular 
regulatory measure can be considered as either a market access restriction or a domestic 
regulation with different legal consequences flowing from the classification. For example, if 
the scope of market access restrictions under Article XVI of the GATS were defined too 
broadly, many domestic regulations would be prohibited and ongoing negotiations would lose 
much of their purpose.305 Furthermore, a broad definition of market access provisions can 
lead to a situation where violations of WTO provisions are found where broad regulatory 
autonomy was envisioned.306 A detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the main scope of this 
work but the general issues surrounding this debate are considered below. 
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GATS, (2005) 4(2) World Trade Review, 133. 
306  Ibid. 
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The WTO dispute settlement body had the opportunity in the US-Gambling case to determine 
the scope of market access provisions.307 Both the Panel and AB had to decide whether 
certain provisions imposed by US Federal and State law prohibiting the remote supply of 
gambling and betting services (mode I) were contrary to specific commitments made by the 
US granting unlimited market access to foreign suppliers in this sector. The laws in question 
were intended to address concerns, such as, money laundering, fraud, organised crime, and 
compulsive and under age gambling.  
 
Both dispute settlement bodies confirmed certain important distinguishing features of Article 
XVI (market access) and Article VI (domestic regulation). One of the key distinguishing 
features that was highlighted is that ‘market access obligations set forth in Article XVI were 
intended to be obligations in respect of quantitative, or “quantitative-type measures”.308 The 
AB came to this view by looking at, among other things, the guidelines for scheduling 
commitments, which provides in relevant part that:  
 
‘The quantitative restrictions [in Article XVI] can be expressed numerically, 
or through the criteria specified in subparagraphs (a) to (d); these criteria do 
not relate to the quality of the service supplied, or to the ability of the 
supplier to supply the service (i.e. technical standards or qualification of the 
supplier)’.309 
 
After conducting a lengthy analysis of Article XVI of the GATS dealing with market access, 
both the Panel and AB decided that the total ban imposed by the US provisions could be 
expressed numerically as a ‘zero quota’, and as such was a measure restricting market access. 
This decision has been severely criticised by Pauwelyn who argues that the dispute settlement 
bodies’ focus was placed on the effect of the measures in question. He argues that: 
 
‘…[if] Article XVI were to include domestic regulation simply because it 
also has the effect of quantitatively restricting the number of services or 
suppliers that can enter the market, then most domestic regulation would 
                                                   
307  United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US – 
Gambling), WT/DS285/AB/R. 
308  Ibid para 248. 
309  1993 Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 30, at para. 4. Repeated also in Guidelines for the Scheduling of 
Specific Commitments Under the GATS, adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 23 March 2001, 
S/L/92 (hereafter ‘Revised Scheduling Guidelines of 2001’) 4. 
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already be prohibited by Article XVI, unless it can be justified under the 
limited exceptions of Articles XIV and XIVbis. If so, why bother negotiating 
further disciplines under Article VI:4?’310 
 
3.6  Conclusion   
 
One of the observations that can be made with regard to much of the discussion on Article VI 
is that it is still a work in progress. Many of the issues surrounding domestic regulation 
remain under negotiation and the impact that future disciplines will have is yet to be seen. It 
is encouraging to note that the negotiations have now reached a stage where draft texts are 
being formulated. Provisions on domestic regulation are extremely important and the utmost 
effort should be made to ensure that negotiations are completed timeously. In light of the 
collapse of the DOHA round of negotiations it is with concern that one awaits the outcome of 
current negotiations. The next chapter endeavors to look at some of the policy objectives that 
South Africa has set in the telecommunications sector, objectives which are achieved through 
licences issued to telecoms operators. Such licensing requirements are among the regulations 
that future disciplines seek to address. 
                                                   
310  Pauwelyn J, ‘Rien ne Vas Plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulation from Market Access in GATT and 
GATS’, (2005) World Trade Review, 161. 
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____________________________________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 4 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA’S DOMESTIC POLICY 
OBJECTIVES 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4.1 Overview of telecommunications sector 
 
Much like the service sector as a whole, telecom services are an essential part of any 
economy because of the dual role they play, both as ‘a source of economic growth and an 
enabler of growth in other sectors’.311 Access to telecoms is absolutely essential to achieving 
both the economic and social goals of any country. One author has described telecoms 
networks as a country’s nervous system, in the absence of which no country can develop and 
progress.312 As noted in the introduction to this work, telecom services had until recently 
been provided largely through government owned operators.313 The last few decades, 
however, saw a shift toward the liberalisation and privatisation of these services. The reasons 
for this shift include: increasing evidence that liberalised telecoms markets innovate faster 
and serve the consumer better; the need to attract capital to expand and upgrade telecoms 
networks; and the development of international trade in telecoms.314 Liberalisation has been 
accompanied by new laws and policies as well as by new regulatory agencies to implement 
them.315 
 
South Africa has not been an exception to this move toward liberalised telecoms markets. A 
White Paper316 on telecoms policy in South Africa published in 1996 noted the need for a 
new market structure which would orientate the sector toward “accelerated development” 
                                                   
311  Republic of South Africa, The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy, GG No. 16995 of 13 March 
1996 26 para 1.5. 
312  Haroon, Y, Regulation and Diplomacy in Telecommunications (2004), ICT Working Paper No. ICT-TM-
2004, 5 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=727203> [accessed on 3 November 2008]. 
313  See paragraph 1.3.1 above. The reason these services were provided largely through government lay partly 
in the thinking that these services were considered as being able to deliver strong social gains that could be 
realized mainly through government involvement. (Hodge J, ‘Liberalising Communication Services in 
South Africa’, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/SAfrTelecom.pdf> 
[accessed on October 7, 2008].   
314  Intven H, Tetrault M, ‘Overview of telecommunication regulation’, in Intven H, Oliver J, and Sepulveda E, 
Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, (2000) 1-1. 
315  Melody, H (1997) Telecom Reform: Principles, Policies, and Regulatory Practices, 2. 
316  The White Paper has its history in the British parliamentary system and it basically contains governments 
thinking on a particular issue that it is to be legislated. 
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and which would take into account “technological and international trends”.317 To achieve 
this, the South African government developed a policy widely referred to as “managed 
liberalisation” which was aimed at opening up the sector in a phased process.318 Before 
examining this policy and the current telecoms market structure, it is important to briefly 
examine the history of telecoms in South Africa. Such a discussion is important in 
understanding some of the current policy objectives of the sector, policies which can 
potentially be affected by WTO law. 
 
4.2 History of telecoms in South Africa 
 
Telecoms services in South Africa were previously provided by South African Post and 
Telecommunications (SAPT).319 Like many telecoms providers at that time, SAPT was a 
government monopoly controlled by the Minister of Transport and Communication. In the 
case of South Africa this meant that the political ideology of apartheid that prevailed at the 
time influenced the provision of SAPT’s services which were skewed largely along racial 
lines.320 Horwitz notes that at the time South Africa began its political transition in 1990, the 
approximately 3 million lines that were available were provided primarily to whites and to 
business.321 He further notes that figures from 1989 showed the level of telephone 
penetration per 100 blacks at 2,4 whereas that for whites was at 25.322 
 
As different factors during the late eighties and early nineties forced a shift in the economic 
and ideological policies of the government of the time, privatisation was put forward as part 
of the government’s long term economic strategy.323 This included the privatisation of 
parastatals, such as, SAPT which were inefficient and heavily in debt.324 In 1991, postal and 
                                                   
317  Republic of South Africa, The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy, GG No. 16995 of 13 March 
1996 26 para 2.1.  
318  Gillwald A, ‘Good intentions poor outcomes: Telecommunications reform in South Africa’, (2005) 29 
Telecommunications Policy 470. 
319  Cohen T, Domestic policy and South Africa’s commitments under the WTO’s Basic Telecommunications 
Agreement: Explaining the apparent inertia, (2001) 4(4) Journal of International Economic Law 730. 
320  Horwitz, Robert B, 'Telecommunications policy in the new South Africa: participatory politics and sectoral 
reform', (1997) 23 Communicatio 64. 
321  Ibid. 
322  Ibid. 
323  Horwitz, Robert B, 'Telecommunications policy in the new South Africa: participatory politics and sectoral 
reform', (1997) 23(2) Communicatio 66.  
324  Cohen T, Domestic policy and South Africa’s commitments under the WTO’s Basic Telecommunications 
Agreement: Explaining the apparent inertia, (2001) 4(4) Journal of International Economic Law 730. 
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telecoms services were separated and removed from direct ministerial control.325 A new 
telecommunications company, named Telkom, was created to provide and oversee the 
provision of telecommunications. It is important to note that even though Telkom was no 
longer under direct ministerial control, it had not been privatised per se.326 The government 
opted to begin by first commercialising Telkom as a way for first preparing it for 
privatisation.327 This meant that Telkom still remained state owned, with the difference 
between it and SAPT being that Telkom paid dividends and taxes, and was largely 
responsible for rising its own funding.328 On a different front, the government decided to 
issue two cellular phone licences in 1994, a move which further opened up the 
telecommunications sector.329  
 
After elections in 1994 and the coming into power of a new government, steps were initiated 
to develop a new telecommunications policy for South Africa. Horwitz identifies three events 
which helped shape this new policy. They include, first, the creation of a National 
Telecommunications Forum (NTF) which brought together government, business, labour, 
user groups, and civic groups; secondly, the development of the governments’ 
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP)330 which set the goal that telephones 
should be provided to every school and health clinic; and finally, the development of a White 
Paper on policy for the sector.331 The result of these processes, and especially the formulation 
of the White Paper, is South Africa’s “managed liberalisation” policy, a policy which has 
largely determined the telecoms market structure of South Africa today. 
 
                                                   
325   Ibid. 
326  Cohen T, Domestic policy and South Africa’s commitments under the WTO’s Basic Telecommunications 
Agreement: Explaining the apparent inertia, (2001) 4(4) Journal of International Economic Law 730. 
According to Horwitz, there was initial resistance to privatisation by the incoming African National 
Congress government because they saw privatisation as a strategy of the former regime to transfer 
government held entities to the private sector where they would continue to exercise control over them. 
(Horwitz, Robert B, 'Telecommunications policy in the new South Africa: participatory politics and sectoral 
reform', (1997) 23 Communicatio, 66.) 
327  Ibid. 
328  Ibid. 
329  Hodge J, ‘Liberalising Communication Services in South Africa’, 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/SAfrTelecom.pdf> [accessed on 
October 7, 2008. 
330  RDP was a “integrated and coherent socio-economic policy framework” that was developed in 1994 by the 
new South African government with goals for “the final eradication of the results of  apartheid” (RDP White 
Paper, Discussion Document, September 1994, < http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/white.html#1.3> 
[accessed on 7 October 2008.) 
331  Horwitz, Robert B, 'Telecommunications policy in the new South Africa: participatory politics and sectoral 
reform', (1997) 23 Communicatio, 69. 
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4.3 Managed liberalisation and current market structure  
4.3.1 Managed liberalisation 
 
According to the White Paper on telecoms policy, at the centre of government’s liberalisation 
policy would be a five year period where Telkom would exclusively be authorised to provide 
certain specific services.332 This period of exclusivity was extended to the provision of 
services, such as, national long distance, international and local access telecoms services, 
public payphone services, and the provision of facilities that would enable the provision of 
Value Added Network Services (VANS).333 This period of exclusivity was granted to Telkom 
to achieve certain goals which included:  
 
‘…the expansion of the telecommunications infrastructure and attainment of 
universal service, the promotion of growth within the sector as an enabling 
infrastructure for economic growth in other areas, the adoption of strong 
customer focus, and the enhancement of South Africa’s telecoms capacity 
internationally.’334 
 
It is significant to note here that South Africa’s strategy for liberalising the telecoms sector 
serves as an example on a broad scale of the balance that must be struck between 
liberalisation and specific national policy objectives. This tension is captured in the following 
excerpt from the telecoms White Paper: 
 
‘The challenge is to articulate a vision that balances the provision of basic 
universal service to disadvantaged rural and urban communities with the 
delivery of high-level services capable of meeting the needs of a growing 
South African economy.’335 
 
 As can be seen from the above excerpt, South Africa’s liberalisation strategy was 
particularly influenced by policy considerations, such as universal service. South Africa’s 
                                                   
332  Republic of South Africa, The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy, GG No. 16995 of 13 March 
1996 26 para 2.6. 
333  Msimang M, ‘Universal Service and Universal Access’, in Thorton L, Carrim Y, Mtshaulana P, Reburn P 
(eds), Telecommunications Law in South Africa, (2006) 231. 
334  Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette No. 16995, The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy, 
13 March 1996 26 para 2.6. 
335  Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette No. 16995, The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy, 
13 March 1996 26 para 1.2. 
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government acknowledged telecoms infrastructure and universal service as the most 
important priorities for Telkom during this period of exclusivity, and, therefore saw it fit to 
stagger the pace of liberalisation to ensure these priorities were met.336 These objectives were 
enforced through the license issued to Telkom as well as licences issued to other operators. 
 
In terms of this policy, after the expiry of the five year period of exclusivity that had been 
granted to Telkom, it was envisioned that a Second National Operator (SNO) would be 
licensed to introduce more competition into the sector.337 Two other important aspects of 
South Africa’s managed liberalisation policy were, the eventual licensing of a further mobile 
phone operator, as well as the introduction of an independent regulator responsible for 
overseeing the sector. It is important to note that even though mobile phone operators and 
providers of Value Added Services (VAS) were liberalised, they were somewhat constrained 
by the requirement of having to use Telkom’s networks.338  
 
4.3.2 Current market structure 
 
The current telecommunications market structure in South Africa reflects the 
abovementioned policy. The market structure can best be looked at by considering three 
major areas of the telecoms sector. These areas are: fixed-line operators, mobile phone 
operators, and VAS providers.339 It is also important in this regard to briefly consider the 
regulatory body tasked with overseeing this sector.  
 
4.3.2.1 Fixed-line operators 
 
There are currently two fixed-line service providers in South Africa. As noted above, South 
Africa’s telecommunications policy envisioned the granting of a monopoly for a period of 
five years to Telkom after which a SNO would be licensed. The Telecommunications 
                                                   
336  Republic of South Africa, The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy, GG No. 16995 of 13 March 
1996 26 para 2.11. A detailed discussion on Universal Service in the context of South Africa will be 
conducted below. 
337  Republic of South Africa, The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy, GG No. 16995 of 13 March 
1996 26 para 2.22. 
338  Gillwald A, ‘Good intentions poor outcomes: Telecommunications reform in South Africa’, (2005) 29 
Telecommunications Policy 470. 
339  Bowman Gilfillan Attorneys, ‘Broadcasting and Telecommunications’, in Doing Business in South Africa 
2006, <http://www.lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/PDF/guide_southafrica.pdf> [accessed on 3 November 
2008]. 
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Amendment of Act of 2001340 introduced a SNO whose licence was issued in 2005. The 
SNO, Neotel, was officially launched in August 2006.341 Having only recently started its 
operations, the true impact of the SNO is yet to be realised in South Africa. It is, however, 
widely hoped that the introduction of Neotel will improve competition in the entire telecoms 
sector. 
 
4.3.2.2 Mobile phone operators 
 
The mobile phone sector in South Africa has been slightly more open for competition and for 
a longer period than the fixed-line sector. As noted above, the first two mobile phone 
licences were issued as early as 1993. These licenses were awarded to two companies named 
Mobile Telecommunications Network MTN (Pty) Ltd. and Vodacom (Pty) Ltd. The 
Telecommunications Act (Telecoms Act) which was the result of the White Paper discussed 
above recognised the licenses of these two mobile phone operators which had been issued 
before its coming into force, but required the concerned authority to conduct an enquiry into 
the economic feasibility of the provision of two more cellular telecoms services.342 The 
licence for a third mobile phone operator was issued in June 2001 to Cell C (Pty) Ltd. Until 
the addition of the third mobile phone operator, MTN (Pty) Ltd and Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 
dominated the mobile phone sector, and to a large extent continue to enjoy the largest market 
share in the mobile services sector.343 A fourth mobile phone operator licence was issued on 
June 2006 to Virgin Mobile (Pty) Ltd.344 
 
4.3.2.3 VANS providers 
 
VANS have been defined as: 
 
‘…a telecommunication service provided by a person over a 
telecommunication facility, which facility has been obtained by that person in 
                                                   
340  s1(d) Telecommunications Amendment Act 64 of 2001.  
341  Neotel, ‘SNO Launches services as NEOTEL,’ 31 August 2006 
<http://www.neotel.co.za/neotel/view/neotel/en/page65?oid=1314&sn=Detail> [accessed 10 October 2008]. 
342  Section 37(2)(b) Telecommunications Act No 103 of 1996. 
343  In 2006, it was estimated that Vodacom had approximately 55% market share, MTN 35% and Cell C 10 % 
(www.econex.co.za). 
344  Virgin Mobile Press office, <http://www.virginmobile.co.za/virgin-portal-customer/Press6.do> [30 October 
2008].  
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accordance with the provisions of section 40(2) of the Act to one or more 
customers of that person concurrently, during which value is added for the 
benefit of the customers, which may consist of: 
 
• any kind of technological intervention that would act on the 
content, format or protocol or similar aspects of the signals 
transmitted or received by the customer in order to provide those 
customers with additional, different or restructured information; 
• the provision of authorised access to, and interaction with, 
processes for storing and retrieval of text and data; 
• managed data network services.’345 
 
This definition is better understood by considering examples of VANS. Examples include, 
the provision of e-mail services, access to databases, voicemail, video conferencing, internet 
service provision, web hosting, and telecoms related publishing and advertising.346 South 
Africa’s telecoms policy opened up the provision of VANS services for competition with the 
important proviso that VANS operators provide their facilities through Telkom networks.347 
Specifically, section 40(2) of the Telecoms Act provided that VANS licence should contain a 
provision requiring that their services be provided by facilities provided by Telkom until 
May 2002, after which time they can be provided both Telkom and the SNO until another 
date is fixed, when VANS operators can provide their services using their own networks. 
This, for a long time, caused major concerns for VANS operators because it meant that they 
remained at the mercy of Telkom, both as regards the price they paid to use Telkom’s 
networks as well as in the delays that they experienced in being connected to the facilities 
provided by Telkom.348 This in turn also obviously had an impact on the cost and quality of 
the VANS services to consumers. 
 
A recent decision by the High Court of South Africa has, however, significantly shaken the 
telecoms sector, especially as it relates to VANS and the manner in which they provide their 
services. In the case between Altech Autopage Cellular (Pty) Ltd v The Chairman of the 
                                                   
345  Yacoob S, and Pillay K, ‘Licensing’, in Thorton L, Carrim Y, Mtshaulana P, Reburn P (eds), 
Telecommunications Law in South Africa, (2006) 156. 
346  Section 40(2) Telecommunications Act 103 of 1996. 
347  Gillwald A, ‘Good intentions poor outcomes: Telecommunications reform in South Africa’, (2005) 29 
Telecommunications Policy 469. 
348  Gillwald A, ‘Good intentions poor outcomes: Telecommunications reform in South Africa’, (2005) 29 
Telecommunications Policy 471. 
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Council of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa and Others,349 the 
applicant, a holder of a VANS licence issued under the Telecoms Act (which has now been 
replaced by the Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005 Act [ECA]), contended that it 
had a right in terms of the ECA to have its licence converted into one that would allow it to 
provide its services through its own network, rather than that of Telkom or the SNO.  
 
In terms of the ECA two classes of licences, namely, the Electronic Communications 
Network Service (ECNS) licence and the Electronic Communications Service (ECS) licence 
can be issued.350 The former are issued to entities that own infrastructure, such as, fibre optic 
cables, satellite systems or other fixed systems,351 used to provided telecoms services by 
themselves and by others.352 The latter are issued to entities providing services under 
networks provided by others.353 These licences can further be divided into additional 
categories depending on the ‘feature and importance of the network or service in 
question’.354 Services that are important for socio-economic development receive individual 
licences while those which are not important for socio-economic development receive class 
licences.355 The effect of this is that four different types of licences can be granted, namely, 
Individual Electronic Communications Network Service licence (I-ECNS), an Individual 
Electronic Communications Services licence (I-ECS), a Class Electronic Communications 
Network Service licence (C-ECNS), and a Class Electronic Communications Services 
licence (C-ECS).356 
 
                                                   
349  Altech Autopage Cellular (Pty) Ltd v The Chairman of the Council of the Independent Communications 
Authority of South Africa and Other, Transvaal Provincial Division, Case No 20002/8, yet to be reported.  
350  Section 5(2) ECA. 
351  Section 1 of the ECA defines “electronic communications networks” as:  
‘any system of electronic communication facilities (excluding subscriber equipment), 
including without limitation –  
(a) satellite systems; 
(b) fixed systems (circuit-and packet-switched); 
(c) mobile systems; 
(d) fiber optic cables (under sea and land-based) 
(e) electricity cable systems (to the extent used for electronic communications 
services); and 
(f) other transmission systems, used for conveyance of electronic 
communications’  
352  Nicci Ferguson Inc, ‘A plain, easy-to-follow guide to the licensing regime created by the Electronic 
Communications Act’, (2006) 3. 
353  Ibid. 
354  Ibid. 
355  Ibid. 
356  Nicci Ferguson Inc, ‘A plain, easy-to-follow guide to the licensing regime created by the Electronic 
Communications Act’, (2006) 4. 
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Altech argued that, in terms of certain regulations published by the Minister of 
Communications in the Government Gazette (GG), they were entitled to provide their 
services through telecommunication facilities other than those provided by Telkom and the 
SNO.357 Regulation 4(a) provided in part that ‘…1 February 2005 shall be the date from 
when value added network services may be provided by telecommunications facilities other 
than those provided by Telkom or the SNO or any of them’.358 Despite this, the Minister of 
Communications subsequently refused to approve the above regulations’ and instead 
published new regulations which were silent on the issue of VANS operators being able to 
provide services using their own networks.359 A license issued to the applicant after these 
regulations allowed them to provide their services only through the facilities of others 
licensed to provide such facilities, and not through their own networks. 
 
The applicant had received its original licence under the Telecoms Act, and, in terms of the 
ECA, licences issued under the former Act had to be converted to fit the categories provided 
for in the ECA. It was during this conversion process that the applicant expressed an 
intention to build its own network to be used in the provision of its services. During this 
process, the second respondent, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa 
(ICASA), the body responsible for regulating the telecoms industry, identified certain VANS 
operators who were being considered for licences that would allow them to provide their 
services through their own networks. The applicant was not among the five, which did not 
matter, because ICASA had indicated that all VANS operators would first receive their 
regular licences, after which ICASA would consider those to whom licences to provide 
services through their own networks would be granted, that is, those who would receive I-
ECNS licences. 
 
The applicants contended that the primary respondent in the case changed its stance several 
times, first conceding the right to self-provide VANS services through personal networks, 
then denying such right. It further contended that it was its right in terms of provisions that 
were to oversee the transition from the old telecoms Act to the ECA, to have its licence 
converted into both an I-ECS and I-ECNS licence. The respondent disputed the right of the 
                                                   
357  See, Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette No. 26763, Determinations of dates in terms of the 
Telecommunications Act (Act 103 of 1996), 03 September 2004.  
358  Ibid. 
359  See, Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette No. 27608, Regulations for value added network 
services, 20 May 2005. 
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applicant to an I-ECNS licence through conversion and further argued that not all VANS 
licencees would be entitled to a I-ECSN licence.  After considering arguments for both sides, 
the Court found that ministerial policy directions issued by the Minister of Communication 
were ultra vires the enabling legislation for various reasons, including the fact that the 
Minister had encroached on ICASA’s independence, which is guaranteed by statute. This 
ministerial directive had directed ICASA on how they were to deal with the conversion of 
VANS licences’, this was contrary to the Act and had influenced ICASA to change its earlier 
position which seemed to favour VANS operators providing services through their own 
networks. The Court set aside the various decisions of the Minister and of ICASA, and ruled 
that the applicant was entitled to self provide its own telecommunications facilities as from 1 
February 2005. If further found that the portions of the applicant’s licence that deprived it of 
the entitlement to self provide were of no force or effect.  
 
This judgment has been hailed as a “landmark”, and also as having far reaching implications 
for competition in South Africa’s telecoms sector where tariffs are among the highest in the 
world.360 The ability to self-provide will obviously affect cost and technological innovation, 
as well as increase competition for Telkom and the SNO Neotel. It is, however, important to 
note that the Minister of Communications has indicated her intention to appeal the decision, 
on the grounds that ‘if VANS licencees are allowed to obtain I-ECSN 
licenses…governments managed liberalisation policy will be seriously undermined to the 
detriment of the Information and Communications Technology industry’.361 The real impact 
of the decision, is therefore, yet to be realised. 
 
4.3.2.4 South Africa’s telecoms regulatory body 
 
In the discussion on the Altech case South Africa’s main telecoms regulatory body featured 
heavily. It is, however, important to note that telecoms in South Africa are regulated by 
several different parties. These parties include the Minister responsible for Communications, 
ICASA, and, to the extent that issues related to competition become relevant, the 
                                                   
360  Erasmus G, Comments on major breakthrough in Telecoms, TRALAC Newsletter 2008-09-10, 
<http://www.tralac.org/cgibin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id=1694&news_id=52797&cat_
id=1030> [accessed 16 October 2008]. 
361  Department of Communication, Minister to appeal Altech judgment, 
<http://www.doc.gov.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=280&Itemid=457> [accessed 
October 16, 2008] 19 September 2008. 
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Competition Commission.362 These parties to a certain extent have different influences over 
telecoms in South Africa. In terms of the ECA, the Minister has the power to ‘make policies 
on matters of national policy applicable to the ICT sector’, which must be consistent with the 
objectives of the ECA and other legislation.363 The Act also sets out several other powers of 
the Minister in relation to invitations for the issuing of new licences, her relationship with 
ICASA, and also with regard to the promotion of universal service obligations (USOs). 
 
The ICASA Act, which established the body that oversees both telecommunications and 
broadcasting in South Africa, states the objectives of the regulator as being to regulate 
broadcasting in the public interest, to ensure fairness and diversity broadly representing 
South African society as required by the Constitution, as well as to regulate 
telecommunications in the public interest.364 The main powers of ICASA are exercised in the 
implementation of policy that has been developed by the Minister.365 For example, it plays an 
active part in the issuing of licences based on criteria established by the minister.366 In 
addition, ICASA is also responsible for the adjudication of disputes between providers of 
telecoms services as well as between consumers and such providers.367 
 
4.4 South Africa’s policy objectives in the telecoms sector as enforced through 
licencing 
 
Having considered South Africa’s telecoms market structure, it is important to understand 
some of the policy objectives that the government has set for this sector, and to consider 
how, if at all, WTO provisions on domestic regulation affect the development and 
implementation of these objectives. Provisions of the GATS such as Article VI and future 
disciplines on domestic regulation have a reach on government policy objectives because 
these objectives are achieved through licences issued to operators in this sector. It is 
important to note that as was discussed in chapter three, licencing requirements are among 
the domestic regulations which future disciplines will oversee. In this regard it is important to 
                                                   
362  Mokgosi, L, ‘The telecommunications regulators’, in Thorton L, Carrim Y, Mtshaulana P, Reburn P (eds), 
Telecommunications Law in South Africa, (2006) 101. 
363  Section 3(1) ECA 36 of 2005. 
364  Section 2(a)(b) Independent Communication Authority of South Africa Act 13 of 2000 (as amended) 
365  Mokgosi, L, ‘The telecommunications regulators’, in Thorton L, Carrim Y, Mtshaulana P, Reburn P (eds), 
Telecommunications Law in South Africa, (2006) 111. 
366  Ibid. 
367  Ibid.  
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juxtapose these policies with general WTO law, as well as with those provisions specifically 
dealing with the telecoms sector. These laws will briefly be discussed in the next section, 
before considering the specific policies that the South African government has adopted for 
the telecoms sector. The main policy that will be looked at aims to ensure that every citizen 
in South Africa has access to telecoms services, while at the same time correcting the 
imbalances of South Africa’s past history of racial inequality.  
 
4.5 WTO law on telecommunications 
 
In the discussion on the framework of the GATS it was noted that, at the end of the Uruguay 
Round, there were certain issues on which members could not agree, and on which it was 
decided that further negotiations were needed. Negotiations on these issues, one of which 
was telecommunications, continued after the Uruguay Round, and, as agreement was 
reached, the documents reflecting members’ consensus were incorporated into the GATS as 
annexures and protocols. The provisions of GATS that specifically deal with 
telecommunications were, therefore, incorporated into GATS after the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round. These documents include, inter alia, the Annex on Telecommunications (the 
Annex) and the Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles (Reference Paper) of 24 April 
1996. The Annex aims at ensuring that commitments made by WTO members in other 
sectors are not frustrated by lack of access to telecoms services.368 As a result the Annex 
guarantees service suppliers ‘access to and use of public telecommunications transport 
networks and services on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions’.369 
 
The Reference Paper on the other hand, is aimed at ensuring that the market power of former 
monopolies ‘is not used to the detriment of new market entrants’.370  Among the issues that 
the Reference Paper seeks to ensure is the prevention of anti-competitive behaviour through, 
for example, requiring members to ensure that major suppliers371 do not engage in anti-
                                                   
368  Krajewski M, (2003) National Regulation and Trade Liberalisation in Services: The Legal Impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy 167. 
369  Article 5(a) Annex on Telecommunications. 
370  Krajewski M, (2003) National Regulation and Trade Liberalisation in Services: The Legal Impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy 166. 
371  ‘Major supplier’ is defined in the reference paper as: ‘a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the 
terms of participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic 
telecommunications services as a result of: (a) control over essential facilities; or (b) use of its position in 
the market’. 
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competitive practices, requiring members to ensure interconnection with major suppliers in a 
non-discriminatory way, ensuring that USOs do not hinder international trade, and finally, 
requiring members to establish an independent regulator.372 
The WTO recently celebrated 10 years of the coming into force of these agreements with an 
acknowledgment of the contribution they have made to in the liberalisation of the telecoms 
sector.373 It is these agreements as well as other the WTO law already discussed whose effect 
on domestic regulation to achieve policy objectives in the telecoms sector must be 
considered. It is also import to keep in mind the specific commitments made by South Africa 
in the telecoms sector. South Africa’s schedule of commitments for the telecommunications 
sector is contained in Annexure C of this study. 
 
4.6 Universal service obligation (USO) 
 
It is widely acknowledged that there exists a “digital divide” between developed and 
developing countries especially those located in Africa. This digital divide refers to the ‘gap 
between those with effective access to digital and information technology and those 
without’.374 The digital divide does not only manifest itself at the global level but exists also 
within individual countries such as South Africa.  
 
One of the mechanisms that has been used globally to bridge the divide that exists within an 
individual country is the imposition of universal service (US) and universal access (UA) 
obligations. US can be defined as a policy which focuses on promoting universal availability 
of connections by each individual household to public telecommunications networks.375 
Defined another way, US is a policy that endeavours to see the availability of a telephone in 
individual homes. US policies can be difficult to achieve, and are usually employed by 
developed countries because of the economic muscle they have which can help them bring 
such goals to fruition. For example, the European Union’s directive on US provides that, 
‘Member States shall ensure that the services set out in this chapter are made available at the 
                                                   
372  See Reference Paper Article 1-6. 
373  WTO News, WTO DG celebrates benefits of opening trade in telecoms, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl86_e.htm> [accessed 3 November 2008]. 
374  Wikipedia, Digital Divide, < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_divide> [accessed on 18 October 2008]. 
375  Intven H and Tetrault M, ‘Overview of telecommunication regulation’, in Intven H, Oliver J, and Sepulveda 
E, Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, (2000) 6-1. 
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quality specified to all end-users in their territory, independently of geographical location, 
and, in light of specific national conditions, at an affordable price’.376  
 
UA on the other hand refers to a policy that seeks to ensure that every person has reasonable 
means of access to publicly available telecoms facilities.377 This differs from US in that, 
rather than providing services to each individual, common access points where people can 
access these services are provided. UA is obviously a more realistic objective for developing 
countries, given that it would be easier to achieve than US.  
 
UA to key services such as telecommunications is a critical developmental objective in most 
countries.378 Tuthill describes these goals as policy objectives that fall within a country’s 
“right to regulate” as set out in the preamble to the GATS.379 He further notes that these 
requirements are not market access restrictions but rather domestic regulations as set out in 
Article VI of the GATS.380  
 
Even though they are defined differently, they are essentially aimed at ensuring the 
availability and affordability of telecoms services to the public, goals which would not easily 
be achieved where markets have been opened up for competition.381 The precise manner in 
which US and UA are achieved usually varies from country to country. This is so because 
factors, such as, the level of technology advancement, socio-economic background, and 
history within a particular country, require that US goals be adopted to take these factors into 
account. Furthermore, both developed and developing countries also have to adjust their US 
goals to take into account ‘advancing user demands and market developments’ at different 
                                                   
376  Chapter II Article 3:1, European Union, Directive of the European parliament and of the Council on 
universal access and user’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (universal 
service directive), 2000/0183. 
377  Intven H and Tetrault M, ‘Universal Service’, in Intven H and Tetrault M (eds) Telecommunications 
Regulation Handbook, (2000) 6-1.  
378  South Center, The Development Dimension of the GATS Domestic Regulation Negotiations, 
SC/AN/TPD/SV/11, August 2006 23.  
379  Tuthill L, Universal Service in Telecom: How did the telecom sector adopt GATS to universal service in a 
competitive environment, UNCTAD Expert Meeting 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c1em30p025_en.pdf> [accessed on 3 November 2008]. 
380  Ibid. 
381  Garnham, N, Universal Service, in Melody, H (1997) Telecom Reform: Principles, Policies, and Regulatory 
Practices 200. 
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times.382 There are, however, certain core strategies that countries employ to achieve these 
objectives. These include, the establishment of a universal services funds (USF), 
contributions to which are sourced from operators who have received licences to provide 
telecoms services, the granting of special licenses to operators to provide services in rural 
and remote areas, and in the case of South Africa, the granting of a period of exclusivity to a 
particular operator with specific obligations to ensure UA.383 
 
These obligations are applied in the telecoms sectors of almost all countries of the world. 
USOs, therefore, serve as an example of policy considerations in the telecoms sector for 
which countries need the leeway to plan, taking into account their individual contexts. It is 
important to note that the WTO has sought to ensure that where US and UA policies are 
developed, they are developed in a manner that does not hinder international trade. This is 
done not in the context of Article VI of the GATS but, as was noted earlier, in terms of 
section 3 of the Reference Paper. This section acknowledges the right of a WTO member to 
define the kind of USOs they wishes to maintain, and notes that such obligations would not 
be considered anti-competitive per se, provided that they are administered in a transparent, 
non-discriminatory, and competitively neutral manner, and are not more burdensome than 
necessary to achieve the kind of USO defined by individual members.384 Krajewski observes 
that the language contained in the Reference Paper draws on elements of Article VI by 
making USOs subject to a necessity test.385 Even though it is the Reference Paper that 
specifically discusses USOs, it is submitted that these obligations are often not substantive 
requirements for setting up telecoms services, and as such, would also fall to be considered 
under Article VI.  
 
The next section aims to look at how South Africa has specifically sought to achieve UA and 
whether its mechanism will stand up to the scrutiny of future disciplines on domestic 
regulation, or even to the requirements of the Reference Paper.  
 
                                                   
382  European Union, Directive of the European parliament and of the Council on universal access and user’ 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (universal service directive), 2000/0183, 
2. 
383  Msimang, M, ‘Universal Service and Universal Access’, in Thorton L, Carrim Y, Mtshaulana P, Reburn P 
(eds), Telecommunications Law in South Africa, (2006) 218. 
384  WTO, Reference Paper on basic telecommunication services, 24 April 1996, para 3. 
385  Krajewski M, Nationa Regulation and Trade Liberalisation in Services: The Legal Impact of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy (2003) 169. 
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4.6.1 South Africa’s universal access policy 
 
It has been noted that even though USOs have at their core the same objectives, the 
modalities of achieving these goals vary from country to country. In the context of South 
Africa, it widely acknowledged that the central goal of its USOs is ‘to reverse the damage 
caused by decades of policies that promoted racial discrimination and denied certain 
individuals access to telecommunication services’.386  This can be seen in the White Paper on 
telecommunications which sets affordable communication for all at the core of the 
government’s vision, and the goal of its policy, as well as in the objectives of the ECA. For 
example, the White Paper in its introductory paragraphs notes that: 
 
‘In designing the universal service agency, and incorporating it into the 
Telecommunications Act, it will be important to keep in mind the concern 
…that classic approaches to managing the implementation of 
telecommunications policy would not be sufficient to keep the focus on the 
goal of universal service long enough to redress the existing imbalances.  The 
apartheid system left the vast majority of black South Africans, particularly 
in rural communities, without access to basic communications services.  
Liberalisation trends associated with the spread of the global information 
highway and the legitimate needs of South African business and urban areas 
for advanced services could easily combine to draw interest and resources 
away from the delivery of service to rural and disadvantaged areas.  The 
potential development impact of telecommunications would be limited; the 
opportunity would be lost for South Africa to leapfrog traditional stages of 
development through the use of telecommunications to foster the application 
of new information technologies.387 
 
From the above it can also be seen that in South Africa there exists an inseparable link 
between race, accessibility, and affordability of telecoms services which makes South 
Africa’s approach to universal access entirely unique. Any USOs that South Africa adopts 
have to take into account the effects of decades of racial discrimination left over by the 
                                                   
386  Msimang, M, Universal Service and Universal Access, in Thorton L, Carrim Y, Mtshaulana P, Reburn P 
(eds), Telecommunications Law in South Africa, (2006) 218. See also, Cohen T, Domestic policy and South 
Africa’s commitments under the WTO’s Basic Telecommunications Agreement: Explaining the apparent 
inertia, (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic Law 743.  
387  Republic of South Africa, The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy, GG No. 16995 of 13 March 
1996 26 para 1.13. 
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former apartheid policy. This requires both adequate policy space as well as creativity in the 
development of USOs. With this characteristic that makes South Africa’s UA objectives 
different from those of other countries, South Africa has sought to achieve UA through first, 
on a legislative level, stating clearly in the ECA that one of the objectives of the Act is to 
‘promote universal provision of electronic communications networks and electronic 
communications services and connectivity for all’.388 On a more practical level, the 
government has tasked two particular bodies with the responsibility of ensuring that the goal 
of UA is achieved. These bodies are the Universal Services and Access Agency (USAASA) 
and ICASA.  
 
The USAASA was originally established by the Telecoms Act under the name Universal 
Service Agency (USA), and tasked with the following goals: striving to promote universal 
access; encouraging, facilitating and offering guidance in respect of schemes to provide 
universal access; fostering the adoption and use of new methods of attaining universal access 
and service; and stimulating public awareness on the benefits of telecommunications 
services.389 
 
In addition to these goals, the Act also sets for the USAASA the important goal of 
determining the specific content of US and UA in South Africa. As was noted earlier, these 
concepts are dynamic and, therefore, require constant re-definition. Section 82(3) of the ECA 
requires the USASA to ‘from time to time, with due regard to the circumstances and attitudes 
prevailing in the Republic and after obtaining public participation to the greatest degree 
practicable’, make determinations to the Minister regarding what constitutes US and UA. In 
August 2008 the Agency published in the Government Gazette (GG) a notice seeking the 
public’s views on the exact content of these two concepts.390 There is, therefore, currently no 
specific definition of what exactly constitutes UA and US in South Africa. The current 
proposed definitions for UA and US, respectively, are: 
 
                                                   
388  Section 2)(c) ECA. 
389  Section 82(1)-(4) ECA. These goals are a verbatim replication of those that were originally set out in the 
Telecoms Act. It is also important to note that s 80(1) of the ECA provides that despite the repeal of the 
Telecoms Act by the ECA, the USA will continue to exist as a juristic person, but under the name USAASA  
390  Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette No 31333, Notice in terms of section 82(3) and section 
88(2), 3 and 4, of the Electronic Communication Act, 2005 (Act 36 of 2005) inviting written representations 
in respect of definitions of universal services, universal access, and underserviced areas and determinations 
in respect of needy persons, 15 August 2008. 
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“Universal access means that every person, within their area, has reasonable 
(in terms of distance and affordable access to publicly available electronic 
communications network services, electronic communication services, and 
broadcasting services on non-discriminatory basis.” 
 
‘Universal services means a reliable connection from any part of the country, 
to a defined minimum set of electronic communications services and 
broadcasting services, at an affordable rate regardless of geographic location 
including no less than voice, data and broadcasting.’391 
 
Coupled with the above objectives, the USAASA is also responsible for administering a 
Universal Service Fund (USF) which was also initially created by the Telecoms Act and 
continues to exist in terms of the ECA.392 This Fund, which receives money from every 
holder of a telecoms licence issued in terms of the ECA, seeks to provide subsidies that 
encourage telecoms operators to provide their services to ‘uneconomic places and 
persons’.393 In terms of section 88 of the ECA, some of the ways in which the money from 
the USF is used in South Africa include, providing subsidies to public schools and 
institutions of higher learning for procurement of electronic communication services, 
establishment of telecenters and multi-purpose community centres, setting up public 
information terminals, and facilitating the provision of multimedia services. It is important to 
note that it is all licenced telecoms operators that are required to contribute to the Fund, 
which complies with the requirements set out in the Reference Paper that USOs should be 
non-discriminatory. 
 
4.6.2 Under-serviced area licences 
 
Another way that South Africa has sought to achieve US and UA in the telecommunication 
sector is through the granting of Under-Serviced Area licences (USAL).USALs are also not a 
uniquely South African invention, but the manner in which they are utilised takes into 
account the realities on the ground. USALs were introduced by the Telecommunications 
                                                   
391  Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette No 31333, Notice in terms of section 82(3) and section 
88(2), 3 and 4, of the Electronic Communication Act, 2005 (Act 36 of 2005) inviting written representations 
in respect of definitions of universal services, universal access, and underserviced areas and determinations 
in respect of needy persons, 15 August 2008 13, 16. 
392  Section 65(1) of the Act 
393  Msimang, M, Universal Service and Universal Access, in Thorton L, Carrim Y, Mtshaulana P, Reburn P 
(eds), Telecommunications Law in South Africa, (2006) 224. 
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Amendment Act of 2001. Section 40A of this Act provided ICASA with the power to issue 
USALs to small businesses that are preferably made up of persons from groups that were 
historically disadvantaged, in particular women, for the provision of telecom services to 
areas with less than 5% fixed line teledensity.394 It is important to note that these licences are 
not issued to operators using a particular type of technology. Operators granted USAL can 
use any technology that is effective and efficient in putting up the infrastructure and 
providing services to the community to which his licence applies.395 
 
A significant observation that can be made regarding USAL is that it could be argued that the 
criteria for selecting those who are eligible for such licences can be challenged under WTO 
law as being discriminatory, in that preference is given to persons from historically 
disadvantaged backgrounds. The invitation to apply for an USAL published by the Minister 
in the GG provides that of the criteria used to consider applications, those related to 
ownership, control and empowerment will be given preference.396 Such claims can be made 
if for example the clause of the latest negotiating text on future disciplines that specifically 
deals with universal service obligations remains as it is. This clause provides that ‘nothing in 
these disciplines prevents Members from excising the right to introduce or maintain 
regulations in order to ensure provision of universal service, in a manner consistent with their 
obligations and commitments under the GATS’.397 Even though this clause for the most part 
is not too burdensome, it has been noted that the freedom given to countries to regulate to 
achieve universal service is somewhat constrained by the requirement that it has to be 
consistent with the other obligations of the GATS and commitments made by members.398 It 
has been argued that similar provisions that try to ensure that persons from historically 
disadvantaged backgrounds in South Africa violate WTO principles such as market access 
and national treatment and it would therefore not be farfetched to envision a challenge on 
USALs on these grounds.399 That such a policy choice which is obviously important if South 
                                                   
394  S 40A(1)Telecommunications Amendment Act. 
395   S 40A(3) Telecommunications Amendment Act.  
396  Republic of South Africa, Notice in terms of section 34(2) GN 3458/200 in GG 24204, para 21.1. 
397  Working Party on Domestic Regulations, Revised Draft, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Pursuant to 
GATS Article VI:4, 23 January 2008. 
398  South Center, The Development Dimension of the GATS Domestic Regulation Negotiations, 
SC/AN/TPD/SV/11, August 2006 27. 
399  See Mortensen J, WTO Vs. BEE: Why trade liberalisation may block South Africa’s access to wealth, 
prosperity, of just a white collar job, DIIS Working Paper no 2006/30. It is important to note in this regard 
that there remains no definitive answer from the WTO regarding whether South Africa’s laws that seek to 
redress past inequalities are WTO compliant  or not. 
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Africa is to ensure access for those who were previously denied access to telecom services 
under apartheid can potentially be challenged on such grounds illustrates the potential threat 
that Article VI disciplines pose if not carefully crafted. 
 
Because of South Africa’s unique past, the manner in which it deals with UA and US 
requires flexibility, as well as a different framework to that normally utilised by countries 
around the world. In doing this, South Africa as a signatory to the GATS, has to balance the 
Agreements which require that such policy objectives that are transferred into licencing 
requirements do not form unnecessary barriers to trade. With the exception of USAL, it 
appears that South Africa’s USOs are designed in a manner that does not hinder trade. As 
these obligations continue to be defined and re-defined, as is currently happening, South 
Africa needs the policy space to be able to determine what provisions to impose in licences 
issued to telecoms operators in order for US to be achieved. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The January 2008 draft of future disciplines on domestic regulation envisions prohibiting 
licencing requirements ‘other than qualifications requirements with which a natural or 
judicial person is required to comply in order to obtain, amend, or renew authorisation to 
supply a service’. This Chapter has suggested that South Africa’s USOs which are 
intertwined with the goal of correcting its history of racial inequality as it manifested itself in 
access to telecoms services, are such requirements. This is a central objective of any 
economic activity of South Africa’s government, and it will have to continually adapt its 
specific strategies to accord with the circumstances on the ground. This requires flexibility 
and creativity that provisions such as Article VI of GATS might not provide.  
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_______________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This study at the outset, sought to analyse the potential competing interests of international 
trade liberalization and domestic regulation in the context of international trade in services. 
This analysis was carried out against the backdrop of the GATS which explicitly 
acknowledges the right of countries to regulate in order to achieve important national policy 
objectives but which also, through future disciplines to be developed by WTO members, 
seeks to ensure that such regulations do not hinder trade in services. This question was 
considered in the context of the telecoms sector of South Africa where the government has set 
the important goal of achieving universal access to telecom services while taking special note 
of past racial discrimination which contributed to inequalities in access to communication 
services. What follows is a detailed conclusion and recommendations based on the finding of 
the study.  
 
5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
One of the overarching conclusions that can be made regarding the question of domestic 
regulation is that there is a lot of uncertainty as to the exact effect the GATS will have on 
domestic regulation. This uncertainty stems from the fact that disciplines on this issue 
envisioned by Article VI:4 of the GATS remain unfinished. It is important in this regard to 
note that the Doha negotiations to liberalise services trade consist of two tracks, one of which 
is negotiations on domestic regulation.400 This fact was highlighted in a recent report of the 
WPDR where it was noted that negotiations on future disciplines were not taking place in a 
vacuum but rather in relation to other areas of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).401 
                                                   
400  UNCTAD Secretariat, Universal Access to Services, (2006) TD/B/COM.1/EM.30/2, para 64. 
401  WTO Secretariat, Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report of meeting held on 16 June 2008, 
S/WPDR/M/38. 
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Given this, and in light of the fact that the Doha negotiations recently collapsed, it seems 
likely that future disciplines on domestic regulation will be delayed further. 
 
This can only continue the uncertainty and anxiety experienced by Members, especially those 
from DCs who have to prioritise important objectives such as ensuring universal access to 
important services like health, education, water, and telecommunications. In South Africa, 
such delays can potentially affect proper planning of policies that are aimed at rectifying past 
discrimination which affected all areas of its economy. Such anxiety can also result in a 
reluctance to make new commitments in the negotiations to increase market access in 
services. It can also heighten the suspicion of some civil society groups and NGOs who 
continue to view the WTO as an organisation that wants to turn the focus of governments 
away from their core responsibilities toward their citizens and focus them on the interests of 
big business. Because of the importance of domestic regulation to services such as 
telecommunications, health, and educations, it is important for the legitimacy of the 
multilateral trading system that the negotiations of future disciplines be completed in a timely 
manner. Without ignoring the intricacies of these negotiations, it is recommended that, as 
opposed to the “jogging pace” suggested by the chairman of the WPDR, there be an 
increased pace and sense of urgency in the current talks.402  
 
This urgency has to be balanced with ensuring that future disciplines do in fact provide 
countries with the necessary flexibility to ensure that important domestic objectives are met. 
One of the key issues in this regard concerns the necessity test as discussed in chapter 3 
above. Requiring that national regulation be necessary to achieve particular goals has the 
potential to severely limit the flexibility that countries need to deal with the situations in their 
own countries. It is submitted that in the context of South Africa, a strict application of the 
necessity test as it has been applied by the dispute settlement bodies of the WTO in the past 
will cast doubt on some of policies that South Africa has put into place to deal with her past 
of racial discrimination. Many countries have rejected such a test and the current negotiating 
text omits such a test. It is recommended that much like the current text, there be no 
necessity test in the future disciplines on domestic regulation and if one is included, that 
it be used as an interpretive tool. 
                                                   
402  In a recent meeting held by the WPDR, the chairman of the body said in relation to the talks that ‘it was 
suitable neither to sprint, nor to walk, but to maintain a steady “jogging” pace’ WTO Secretariat, Working 
Party on Domestic Regulation, Report of meeting held on 16 June 2008, S/WPDR/M/38. 
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The South Centre has highlighted the weak regulatory institutions and capacities of DCs and 
LDCs.403 They have noted the head start that developing nations have had in building their 
regulatory capacities and institutions and the effect that this has  had over the years in the 
development of highly competitive services in those countries. This fact is an important factor 
as it calls for extra attention for the position of countries in these groups. Once again, the 
position adopted in the current negotiating text is supported as it grants added time to 
developing countries to implement the provisions of the agreement as well as specifically 
calling for technical assistance to these countries. It is recommended that those provisions 
be included in the final agreement on future disciplines with special emphasis being 
placed on technical assistance for DCs and LDCs. 
 
 One of the issues also highlighted by this study is the uncertainty that exists as far as the 
scope of the GATS is concerned. Different interpretations have been offered as to the 
meaning of “in competition” and “on a commercial basis” as set out in Article I of the GATS. 
Even though, as was noted earlier, government actions are increasingly making these 
distinctions irrelevant, it is recommended that guidance be provided on the question 
regarding whether or not public services are covered by the GATS. 
 
Another significant issue that this study sought to consider at the outset was whether the 
claims made by NGOs and civil society organisations regarding the effect of the GATS on 
essential services were valid. This study concluded first that, given the structure of the GATS, 
particularly the flexibility that is allowed to countries in scheduling their commitments, some 
of the fears voiced by these groups might be somewhat misplaced. This is because, as was 
highlighted in chapter 2, the mandatory obligations imposed by the GATS mainly relate to the 
MFN principle as well as to transparency. Most of the other GATS obligations, including 
those on domestic regulation, only apply depending on the specific commitments undertaken 
by individual member countries. As such there is great flexibility for individual country 
members because they can control the services and the type of commitments which they wish 
to make subject to the GATS. It is therefore recommended, especially to DCs and LDCs, 
that considerable attention be paid to the type of services scheduled and to the specific 
commitments undertaken. These countries should use their schedules of commitments to 
                                                   
403 South Center, The Development Dimension of the GATS Domestic Regulation Negotiations, 
SC/AN/TPD/SV/11, August 2006. 
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secure for themselves the necessary policy space to achieve important national 
objectives.   
 
In summary, it appears that much is yet to be determined because of the ongoing nature of 
negotiations in this area. The latest negotiating draft has some cause for optimism even 
though many questions still remain regarding issues such as its stance on USO. It must be 
borne in mind that these negotiations are important for millions of citizens in DCs and LDCs 
who rely on governments to ensure that key services such as health, education, and 
telecommunications are delivered in an efficient and affordable manner and that they are 
widely available to all. It is submitted that the inclusion of the above recommendations will 
allow countries the necessary space to develop and implement policies which will assist them 
in achieving these goals.  
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ANNEXURE A 
 
 
WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION 
RESTRICTED 
 MTN.GNS/W/120 
10 July 1991  
 (98-0000) 
  
 Special Distribution 
 
 
 
SERVICES SECTORAL CLASSIFICATION LIST 
 
 
 
SECTORS AND SUB-SECTORS CORRESPONDING CPC 
 
1. BUSINESS SERVICES  Section B 
 
A. Professional Services 
a. Legal Services                                            
b. Accounting, auditing and bookeeping services             
c. Taxation Services                                        863        
d. Architectural services  8671        
e. Engineering services  8672        
f. Integrated engineering services  8673        
g. Urban planning and landscape  8674            
   architectural services        
h. Medical and dental services  9312        
i. Veterinary services  932 
j. Services provided by midwives, nurses, 
 physiotherapists and para-medical personnel  93191        
k. Other 
 
B. Computer and Related Services 
a. Consultancy services related to the  841            
  installation of computer hardware        
b. Software implementation services  842        
c. Data processing services  843        
d. Data base services  844        
e. Other   
 
C. Research and Development Services 
a. R&D services on natural sciences  851 
b. R&D services on social sciences and humanities  
c. Interdisciplinary R&D services  853 
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D. Real Estate Services 
a. Involving own or leased property  821        
b. On a fee or contract basis  822 
 
E. Rental/Leasing Services without Operators 
a. Relating to ships  83103        
b. Relating to aircraft  83104        
c. Relating to other transport equipment  83101+83102+ 
d. Relating to other machinery and equipment  83106-83109 
e. Other   
 
F. Other Business Services 
a. Advertising services  871        
b. Market research and public opinion  864 
  polling services       
c. Management consulting service  865       
d. Services related to man. consulting   866       
e. Technical testing and analysis serv.  8676       
f. Services incidental to agriculture, hunting and  
  forestry  
g. Services incidental to fishing  882 
h. Services incidental to mining  883+5115       
i. Services incidental to manufacturing  884+885 
    
j. Services incidental to energy distribution  887 
k. Placement and supply services of Personnel  872 
l. Investigation and security  873 
m. Related scientific and technical consulting  8675 
  services 
n. Maintenance and repair of equipment                                
 (not including maritime vessels, aircraft                
  or other transport equipment)  8861-8866       
o. Building-cleaning services  874 
p. Photographic services  875 
q. Packaging services  876 
r. Printing, publishing  88442  
s. Convention services  87909* 
t. Other   
  
 
2. COMMUNICATION SERVICES 
A. Postal services  7511 
 
B. Courier services  7512 
 
C. Telecommunication services 
                                                   
     *The (*) indicates that the service specified is a component of a more aggregated CPC item specified 
elsewhere in this classification list. 
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a. Voice telephone services  7521        
b. Packet-switched data transmission services  7523**        
c. Circuit-switched data transmission services  7523**        
d. Telex services  7523**        
e. Telegraph services  7522 
f. Facsimile services  7521**+7529**        
g. Private leased circuit services  7522**+7523**        
h. Electronic mail  7523**        
i. Voice mail  7523**        
j. On-line information and data base retrieval  7523** 
k. electronic data interchange (EDI)  7523**  
l. enhanced/value-added facsimile services, incl.  
 store and forward, store and retrieve 
m. code and protocol conversion  n.a.        
n. on-line information and/or data 
 processing (incl.transaction processing)  843**        
o. other 
 
 
D. Audiovisual services 
a. Motion picture and video tape production and 9611 
 distribution services 
b. Motion picture projection service  9612        
c. Radio and television services  9613  
d. Radio and television transmission services  7524        
e. Sound recording  n.a.        
f. Other 
 
E. Other 
 
 
3. CONSTRUCTION AND RELATED ENGINEERING SERVICES  
 
A. General construction work for buildings   512 
 
B. General construction work for civil engineering   
 
C. Installation and assembly work  514+516 
 
D. Building completion and finishing work  517 
 
E. Other    
 
    
4. DISTRIBUTION SERVICES     
 
                                                   
     ** The (**) indicates that the service specified constitutes only a part of the total range of activities 
covered by the CPC concordance (e.g. voice mail is only a component of CPC item 7523). 
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A. Commission agents' services  621 
 
B. Wholesale trade services                                   622 
 
C. Retailing services  631+632 
    
 
D. Franchising  8929                                                              
E. Other 
 
 
5. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES                                           
 
A. Primary education services  921 
 
B. Secondary education services  922 
 
C. Higher education services  923 
 
D. Adult education  924 
 
E. Other education services  929 
 
 
6. ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES                                    
 
A. Sewage services  9401 
 
B. Refuse disposal services  9402 
 
C. Sanitation and similar services  9403 
 
D. Other 
 
 
7. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
  
A. All insurance and insurance-related services   812**        
a. Life, accident and health insurance services  8121        
b. Non-life insurance services  8129 
c. Reinsurance and retrocession  81299*        
d. Services auxiliary to insurance (including 
 broking and agency services)  8140 
  
B. Banking and other financial services 
 (excl. insurance) 
a. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds  
 from the public 
b. Lending of all types, incl., inter alia, consumer  
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 credit, mortgage credit, factoring and financing of  
 commercial transaction  
c. Financial leasing  8112        
d. All payment and money transmission services  
e. Guarantees and commitments  81199**        
f. Trading for own account or for account of customers,            
 whether on an exchange, in an over-the-counter              
 market or otherwise, the following:            
 - money market instruments (cheques, bills,  81339**             
   certificate of deposits, etc.)           
 - foreign exchange  81333 
 - derivative products incl., but not limited to,  81339**             
    futures and options 
 - exchange rate and interest rate instruments,  81339**         
    inclu. products such as swaps, forward rate agreements, etc. 
 - transferable securities  81321*           
 - other negotiable instruments and financial  81339**             
   assets, incl. bullion 
g. Participation in issues of all kinds of  8132           
 securities, incl. under-writing and placement  
 as agent (whether publicly or privately) and  
 provision of service related to such issues         
h. Money broking  81339**        
i. Asset management, such as cash or portfolio  8119+** 
 management, all forms of collective  81323* 
 investment management, pension fund 
 management, custodial depository and  
 trust services        
j. Settlement and clearing services for financial  81339**            
 assets, incl. securities, derivative products, or  81319**            
 and other negotiable instruments 
k. Advisory and other auxiliary financial  8131            
 services on all the activities listed in  or  8133 
 Article 1B of MTN.TNC/W/50, incl. credit  
 reference and analysis, investment and  
 portfolio research and advice, advice on  
 acquisitions and on corporate restructuring and strategy        
l. Provision and transfer of financial information,  
 and financial data processing and related  
 software by providers of other financial services 
 
C. Other 
 
8. HEALTH RELATED AND SOCIAL SERVICES      
 (other than those listed under 1.A.h-j.)     
 
A. Hospital services  9311 
 
B. Other Human Health Services  9319 
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   (other than 93191) 
 
C. Social Services  933 
 
D. Other 
 
 
9. TOURISM AND TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES 
 
A. Hotels and restaurants (incl. catering)  641-643 
 
B. Travel agencies and tour operators services  7471 
 
C. Tourist guides services  7472  
 
D. Other            
 
 
10. RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL AND SPORTING SERVICES 
 (other than audiovisual services) 
 
A. Entertainment services (including theatre, live  
 bands and circus services)  9619                   
 
B. News agency services  962 
 
C. Libraries, archives, museums and other 
 cultural services  963 
 
D. Sporting and other recreational services  964 
 
E. Other 
 
 
11. TRANSPORT SERVICES 
A. Maritime Transport Services        
a. Passenger transportation  7211        
b. Freight transportation  7212        
c. Rental of vessels with crew  7213        
d. Maintenance and repair of vessels  8868**        
e. Pushing and towing services  7214 
f. Supporting services for maritime transport  745** 
 
B. Internal Waterways Transport        
a. Passenger transportation  7221        
b. Freight transportation  7222        
c. Rental of vessels with crew  7223        
d. Maintenance and repair of vessels  8868**        
e. Pushing and towing services  7224        
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f. Supporting services for internal waterway  745**            
 transport 
 
C. Air Transport Services        
a. Passenger transportation  731        
b. Freight transportation  732        
c. Rental of aircraft with crew  734        
d. Maintenance and repair of aircraft  8868**        
e. Supporting services for air transport  746 
 
D. Space Transport  733 
 
E. Rail Transport Services 
a. Passenger transportation  7111        
b. Freight transportation  7112        
c. Pushing and towing services  7113        
d. Maintenance and repair of rail transport equipment  
e. Supporting services for rail transport services  743 
 
F. Road Transport Services 
a. Passenger transportation  7121+7122 
b. Freight transportation  7123 
c. Rental of commercial vehicles with operator  7124 
d. Maintenance and repair of road transport  6112+8867            
 equipment        
e. Supporting services for road transport services  
 
G. Pipeline Transport 
a. Transportation of fuels  7131        
b.  Transportation of other goods  7139 
 
H. Services auxiliary to all modes of transport        
a. Cargo-handling services  741        
b. Storage and warehouse services  742        
c. Freight transport agency services  748        
d. Other   
 
I. Other Transport Services  
 
12. OTHER SERVICES NOT INCLUDED ELSEWHERE 
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ANNEXURE B 
LATEST NEGOTIATING DRAFT 
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ANNEXURE C 
South Africa Schedule of Specific Commitments – Telecommunications 
WORLD TRADE GATS/SC/78/Suppl.2 
 11 April 1997 
ORGANISATION  
 (97-1401)  
 
  
Trade in Services 
 
 
 
 SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 Schedule of Specific Commitments 
 
 Supplement 2 
 
 (This is authentic in English only) 
 
 _______________ 
 
 This text supplements the entries relating to the Telecommunication services 
section contained on page 14 of document GATS/SC/78. 
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 ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS BY SOUTH AFRICA 
  
 REFERENCE PAPER 
 
Scope 
 
The following are definitions and principles on the regulatory framework for the basic 
telecommunications services.   
 
Definitions 
 
Users mean service consumers and service suppliers.   
 
Essential facilities mean facilities of a public telecommunications transport network or 
service that 
 
(a)are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number of suppliers;  
and 
 
(b)cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to provide a service. 
 
A major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the terms of 
participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic 
telecommunications services as a result of: 
 
 (a) control over essential facilities;  or 
 
 (b) use of its position in the market. 
 
 
1. Competitive safeguards 
 
1.1 Prevention of anti-competitive practices in telecommunications 
 
 Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers 
who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-
competitive practices. 
 
1.2 Safeguards 
 
 The anti-competitive practices referred to above shall include in particular: 
 
(a)engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization;   
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 (b)using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results;  
and 
 
(c)not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical information 
about essential facilities and commercially relevant information which are 
necessary for them to provide services.  
 
2. Interconnection 
 
2.1 This section applies to linking with suppliers providing public 
telecommunications transport networks or services in order to allow the users of one 
supplier to communicate with users of another supplier and to access services provided 
by another supplier, where specific commitments are undertaken. 
 
 
2.2Interconnection to be ensured 
 
 Interconnection with a major supplier will be ensured at any technically feasible 
point in the network.  Such interconnection is provided. 
 
(a)under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including technical standards and 
specifications) and rates404 and of a quality no less favourable than that 
provided for its own like services or for like services of non-affiliated 
service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates; 
 
(b)in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including technical standards and 
specifications) and cost-oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable, 
having regard to economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that 
the supplier need not pay for network components or facilities that it does 
not require for the service to be provided;   
 
(c)upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered to the 
majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of construction of 
necessary additional facilities;  and 
 
 
2.3 Public availability of the procedures for interconnection negotiations 
 
                                                   
     404The authorities may determine different rates in respect of different services rendered in different areas 
under different circumstances or may determine rates which may be higher or lower than the normal rates 
providing that the determination of such rates is done on a non-discriminatory basis. 
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 The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier will be made 
publicly available. 
 
 
2.4Transparency of interconnection arrangements 
 
 It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available either its 
interconnection agreements or a reference interconnection offer. 
 
 
2.5 Interconnection:  dispute settlement 
 
 A service supplier requesting interconnection with a major supplier will have 
recourse, either: 
 
 (a) at any time or 
 
 (b) after a reasonable period of time which has been made publicly known 
 
to an independent domestic body, which may be a regulatory body as referred to in 
paragraph 5 below, to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and rates 
for interconnection within a reasonable period of time, to the extent that these have not 
been established previously. 
 
3. Universal service 
 
 Any Member has the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it 
wishes to maintain.  Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, 
provided they are administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively 
neutral manner and are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal 
service defined by the Member. 
 
4. Public availability of licensing criteria 
 
 Where a licence is required, all the licensing criteria and the terms and conditions 
of individual licences will be made publicly available. 
 
 The reasons for the denial of a licence will be made known to the applicant upon 
request. 
 
5. Independent regulators 
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 The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic 
telecommunications services. The decisions of and the procedures used by regulators 
shall be impartial with respect to all market participants. 
 
6. Allocation and use of scarce resources 
 
 Any procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources, including 
frequencies, numbers and rights of way, will be carried out in an objective, timely, 
transparent and non-discriminatory manner. The current state of allocated frequency 
bands will be made publicly available, but detailed identification of frequencies allocated 
for specific government uses is not required. 
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